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CARRYING A BIG CARROT: LINKING MULTILATERAL 
DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
David A. Koplow and Philip G. Schrag* 
INTRODUCTION 
The nearly simultaneous end of the Cold War and outbreak of 
armed combat in the Persian Gulf area provide dramatic incentives for 
the United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries to reexamine 
the nature of the emerging threats to their national security. As we 
tum our attention away from a single-minded focus upon the specter of 
nuclear collision between the superpowers, we are immediately con-
fronted by other long-smoldering multilateral issues that will largely 
define the planet's security concerns into the twenty-first century. 
Iraq's chemical attacks on Iran and its invasion of Kuwait are har-
bingers of a world in which the worst apprehensions of intense armed 
conflict routinely originate in the developing countries, not along the 
old Cold War borders of Europe. 
Two issues are of predominant concern. The first, already appar-
ent problem of this new international order is the continuing prolifera-
tion, particularly in developing countries, of modem weapons such as 
ballistic and cruise missiles,. nerve gas warheads and bombs, and nu-
clear explosives. The entire world is jeopardized by the spread, and the 
increased probability of use, of these capabilities because, as the Per-
sian Gulf crises illustrate, local hostilities often threaten to erupt into 
matters of global concern. The second immediate challenge to interna-
tional security arises from the burgeoning demand for increased devel-
opment assistance for the impoverished countries of the third world, 
where the chronic shortages of capital, technology, and expertise have 
rendered meaningful progress largely impossible and made sheer eco-
nomic existence problematic. The crushing burden of poverty threat-
ens to explode with disastrous consequences for both developed and 
developing societies. 
Either of these issues alone would be staggering; together they 
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present an intricate and exceedingly urgent pair of North-South 
problems. In addition, a third factor-the structural inadequacy of the 
world's usual political and legal institutions for dealing with issues of 
this sort-further confounds traditional efforts to create solutions 
through ordinary treaties or other international arrangements. Under 
the.usual international agreements, most countries have insufficient in-
centive to band together for common resolution of their problems, too 
litde assurance that violations can be detected and substantiated in a 
timely fashion, and virtually no effective recourse when aggrieved by 
another party's violation of its legal commitments. 
This Article proposes, as a new element of the "liberal internation-
alism"1 that should characterize the post-Cold War world, a simultane-
ous solution to these three problems. The nations of the world should 
negotiate a series of n;mltilateral agreements to stop the spread of ad-
vanced weaponry, and include in each of them, as an overt incentive for 
developing states to accept the disarmament and verification obliga-
tions, provisions that explicidy require the affluent, developed states to 
make specified monetary and in-kind transfers to the third world par-
ties. 2 The new regime should also provide stronger-than-customary 
treaty procedures for clarifying ambiguities, adjudicating claims, and 
resolving disputes, and should designate one or more multilateral ad-
ministrative and enforcement agencies dedicated to furthering the 
agreements. In short, the wealthy countries, which stand to benefit the 
most from the establishment of a more stable international military en-
vironment, should be willing to pay for it. They should provide aid and 
commercial grants to the developing states that, in turn, should agree 
to accept significant, verifiable limitations, particularly on high-technol-
ogy armaments, as an explicit condition for these important financial 
advantages. While this package approach will not by itself solve all the 
security difficulties of the next century, it offers the best hope for gain-
ing control over some of them and for channeling our collective ener-
gies into productive and mutually beneficial enterprises. 
The argument of the Article is developed in the following six parts. 
Part I examines the problem of multilateral disarmament, summarizing 
the progress registered to date and the areas in which more needs to be 
I. Richard Gardner has defined liberal internationalism as the "intellectual and 
political tradition that believes in the necessity of leadership by liberal democracies in 
the construction of a peaceful world order through multilateral cooperation and effec-
tive international organizations." Gardner, The Comeback of Liberal Internationalism, 
Wash. Q,, Summer 1990, at 23, 23. 
2. The vocabulary used to refer to the economically disadvantaged states of the 
world is vague and inconsistent. Terms like "third world," "underdeveloped," "less 
developed," and "developing" have each gained currency, although there is no gener-
ally agreed definition of the terms or listing of the states to be included within the terms. 
This Article uses the phrases interchangeably. See L. Reynolds, Economic Growth in 
the Third World: An Introduction 5 (1986); Indep. Comm'n on Int'l Dev. Issues, North-
South: A Programme for Survival 31 (1980) [hereinafter A Programme for Survival]. 
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done. It also demonstrates that the coming decades, even after the 
ending of the Cold War, will present stark new threats to United States 
security and world peace, threats that existing arms control institutions 
and treaty regimes have been unable to anticipate and preempt. Part II 
addresses the problems of economic development, drawing on the 
literature describing the importance of judicious foreign assistance in 
promoting sound economic growth in marginal economies, and assess-
ing the international community's currently inadequate response to this 
need. It describes the third world's stake in economic development 
and presents the case for the advanced societies to do more-out of 
sheer economic and political self-interest, if nothing else. Part III then 
suggests that future arms control imperatives will present challenges 
and dangers that are systematically different from those that the world 
has confronted-and resolved inadequately-in the past. It marshals 
the evidence for the propositions that the world's current strategies for 
dampening international conflict through existing types of treaty re-
gimes are already insufficient, and that the trend is worsening. 
Part IV presents our proposal for a "tradeoff, with the developed 
states frankly "buying" the arms control they need, and paying for it 
with guaranteed levels of development assistance that the poor states 
need. This Part then outlines seven principles that underlie the propo-
sal as a whole and presents some of the nuts and bolts that could make 
it operational. While the suggestion may seem radical at first blush-
legalized "bribery" or "economic imperialism" in some eyes-we think 
it offers a realistic, efficient solution to otherwise intractable global 
threats. 
Part V deals with some of the most serious objections that might be 
raised against our strategy, discussing the "morality" of the tradeoff, its 
political acceptability, the precedents for it, and possible alternatives to 
it. Finally, the Conclusion offers some observations about the proposal 
as one component in an overdue, more subtle, conceptualization of na-
tional security. 
Our thesis is that international agreements linking multilateral dis-
armament and economic development, though. novel and potentially 
risky, offer the most promising way out of the international commu-
nity's emerging security impasse. Our program would give both devel-
oped and developing states what they need. It would fashion a flexible, 
enforceable scheme for dealing with the complex fears and incentives 
that are otherwise unaddressed or confined to under-the-table bargain-
ing. Explicit trading may not seem palatable at first, but equipping fu-
ture treaties with both positive incentives and negative sanctions, rather 
than relying exclusively upon negative sanctions alone, could prove to 
be far more tolerable than any of the alternatives. 
I. THE NEED FOR MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL 
The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union 
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will remain at the center of each of these countries' security concerns 
for the foreseeable future.3 Although these nations have made signifi-
cant progress on a host of issues, including bilateral arms control,4 
trade,5 human rights,6 and regional matters,7 the danger of a nuclear 
war initiated between the superpowers will linger for as long as such 
weapons remain in their arsenals. 8 The recent rapprochement between 
3. On the American side, for example, even while the defense budget is being cut 
somewhat in response to events inside the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Bush 
Administration has proposed that the spending on strategic nuclear forces (dedicated 
principally to deterring the U.S.S.R.) should actually increase, and larger cuts should be 
taken out of general purpose conventional forces. See Graham & Bunn, Budget Shifts 
Resources from Conventional to Strategic Forces, Arms Control Today, Feb. 1990, at 
29, 29. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney has stressed the continuing nature of the 
Soviet threat and cautioned that the American military must still be capable of respond-
ing to the U.S.S.R.'s power. See Halverson, As Defense Budget Battles Continue, 
Cheney Blasts Congress on Soviet Threat, Arms Control Today, Sept. 1989, at 29, 29. 
4. Recently, for example, the Soviet Union has admitted that the radar facility it had 
under construction near the city of Krasnoyarsk was illegal under the Treaty on the 
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 
U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 [hereinafter ABM Treaty]. Soviet officials have agreed 
to dismantle the facility in its entirety, without preconditions-a step that removes a 
major irritant from U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations. See Bunn, The ABM Treaty: 
Toward the 21st Century, Arms Control Today, Apr. 1990, at 13, 13. 
5. At the 1990 summit meetings in Washington, D.C., President Bush and Presi-
dent Gorbachev signed treaties to lower trade tariffs between the two states, to grant the 
Soviet Union "most favored nation status,'' and to sell quantities of grain to the U.S.S.R. 
See Farnsworth, Trade Accord Holds Many Prizes, But Obstacles to Passage Remain, 
N.Y. Times, june 2, 1990, at 7, col. 1; Rosenthal, Bush and Gorbachev Sign Major Ac-
cords on Missiles, Chemical Weapons and Trade, N.Y. Times, june 2, 1990, at 1, col. 6. 
6. The 1990 Washington summit meetings produced progress, but not complete 
U.S.-Soviet accord, regarding jewish emigration from the U.S.S.R. to Israel. Moscow 
has granted an increased number of exit visas, but concern lingers over the resettlement 
of new immigrants in Israeli occupied territories. The United States has tied progress in 
economic and trade issues to Soviet passage of a new law guaranteeing unfettered emi-
gration rights. See Rosenthal, Summit Talks End with Warmth But Fail to Resolve Key 
Issues, N.Y. Times, june 4, 1990, at Al, col. 6. 
7. The United States and Soviet Union have disagreed over some of the fundamen-
tal aspects of the political reconfiguration of Eastern Europe, including questions such 
as the future of a reunified Germany and the political independence of the Baltic states. 
See Rosenthal, supra note 6, at Al, col. 6. Nevertheless, they, along with the other 
countries of Europe, have already begun disengaging their conventional military forces 
on the European continent. See Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 
19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 1 (1991) [hereinafter CFE Treaty]. 
8. During the Reykjavik summit meeting on October 11-12, 1986, President 
Reagan and President Gorbachev raised far-reaching proposals to abolish nuclear weap-
ons entirely-the first time that such visionary notions had been seriously addressed by 
the superpowers. But those discussions quickly came unraveled, and arms control has 
continued to concentrate on more modest objectives. See Bertram, US-Soviet Nuclear 
Arms Control, 1987 Stockholm Int'l Peace Res. Inst. (SlPRI) Y.B., World Armaments 
and Disarmament 323, 323-27 [hereinafter 1987 SIPRI Y.B.]; Stutzle, Introduction: 
1986-A Year of Peace?, 1987 SIPRI Y.B. xxv, xxix-xxxiv. Even under the terms of the 
contemplated "deep cuts" START agreement, for example, the United States and So-
viet Union would each retain thousands of nuclear warheads and systems for delivering 
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the first world and the second world has been stunning,9 but it augurs a 
security apparatus in which complex issues will persist, 10 and the rela-
tionship between erstwhile antagonists will now be characterized by a 
shifting, uncertain mixture of competition and cooperation in eco-
nomic, military, diplomatic, and other spheres.11 
Even as the Cold War is losing its grip on our imaginations,12 the 
fears that bedeviled a generation of security experts are taking new 
forms. 13 Scenarios describing progressive bipolar escalation to nuclear 
war14 have given way to newer but equally horrific scenarios depicting 
the United States becoming enmeshed in nuclear conflicts that origi-
nate in the Middle East or South Asia.15 The planet now presents a 
those devices upon targets anywhere in the world. See Gordon, Talks Fail to End Dis-
putes on Long-Range Weapons, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1990, at 4, col. I; Rosenthal, supra 
note 5, at 1, col. 6. 
Even a limited nuclear war--one involving relatively small numbers of weapons and 
confined to a few countries-would have catastrophic effects on global climate and ecol-
ogy,jeopardizing all countries. See Robock, New Models Confirm Nuclear Winter, Bull. 
Atom. Scientists, Sept. 1989, at 32, 32-35; Turco, Toon, Ackerman, Pollack & Sagan, 
Climate and Smoke: An Appraisal of Nuclear Winter, 247 Science 166, 166 (1990). 
9. See Final Declaration Issued by NATO Summit Leaders, reprinted in This Alli-
ance Must and Will Adapt, Wash. Post, July 7, 1990, at Al8, col. 5 (allied leaders ask 
Warsaw Pact countries to accept "a joint declaration in which we solemnly state that we 
are no longer adversaries"). 
10. The possible political disintegration of the Soviet Union, as constituent repub-
lics declare their autonomy, adds a new element of uncertainty to the global calculation. 
See Dobbs, Ukraine Makes Broad Statement of Sovereignty, Wash. Post,July 17, 1990, 
at AI, col. 5. The Cold War at least provided a sense of stability and clarity about inter-
national affairs, while perestroika may prove to be only a transitory phenomenon, pending 
the breakup of the U.S.S.R. into several unstable factions, some of which might be less 
responsible custodians of nuclear weapons than any past Soviet leaders. Cf. 
Mearsheimer, Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War, Atlantic, Aug. 1990, at 35, 35 
(greater political autonomy for European states may increase probabilities of nuclear 
weapons proliferation and of European war, as rigidity of bipolar continental balance of 
terror is relaxed). 
11. See J. Baker, A Sound Investment in Freedom's Future, Secretary of State's 
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State and Related Agencies of 
the Senate Appropriations Comm., Apr. 25, 1990, reprinted in U.S. Dep't of State, Cur-
rent Pol'y No. 1275, at 2 (describing shared interests between United States aud Soviet 
Union, but also calling for realistic, cautious approach to ongoing perestroika). 
12. During the 1990 Washington summit, President Bush observed that "[w]e've 
moved a long, long way from the depths of the cold war." Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 
All, col. 6. A recent public opinion poll indicates that two-thirds of the American pub-
lic agrees that "the Cold War between East and West is coming to an end" and that by 
substantial margins, those surveyed consider international terrorism, drug trafficking, 
and the economic power of Japan each to be greater threats to the United States than is 
the military power of the Soviet Union. See Washington Post-ABC News Poll, Wash. 
Post, May 27, 1990, at A24, col. 4. 
13. Cf. Klare, An Arms Control Agenda for the Third World, Arms Control Today, 
Apr. 1990, at 8, 8-12 (arms rivalries among developing countries now pose important 
threats to peace worldwide). 
14. See Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (1965). 
15. See Jones & Miiller, Preventing a Nuclear Sarajevo: Proliferation in the Middle 
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more complex array of political actors, with diverse centers of power 
and danger, and with many more states clamoring for attention, auton-
omy, and influence. The United States and the Soviet Union can no 
longer call as many shots as they once could; as a result, their security 
will increasingly depend upon the voluntary cooperation and self-re-
straint of others.16 
The world has long acknowledged the growing importance of a 
multilateral approach 17 to arms control, 18 and several significant multi-
lateral arms control agreements reflect the value of a global solution to 
the problems.19 The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT},20 the 
East and South Asia, Arms Control Today, jan./Feb. 1989, at 15, 15-16; Spector, Non-
proliferation: After the Bomb Has Spread, Anns Control Today, Dec. 1988, at 8, 8-10. 
16. For example, in the ongoing negotiations toward an "Open Skies" agreement 
(a treaty that would permit reciprocal aerial overflight and reconnaissance over the terri-
tories~fthe NATO and Warsaw Pact states), the former Soviet "satellite" countries of 
Eastern Europe have distanced themselves from the negotiating positions advocated by 
the U.S.S.R., staking out independent attitudes in a fashion that would not have been 
possible a few years ago. See Howard, Soviets Gain Little Support for Proposal, To-
ronto Globe & Mail, Feb. 5, 1990, at A4, col. 6; Lewis, Soviet Position at 'Open Skies' 
Talks Puzzles West, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1990, § 1, at 11, col. 1. 
17. The principal multilateral fora for addressing arms control issues are the 
United Nations (where discussions have centered in the General Assembly, the First 
Committee, the three special sessions on disarmament, the Disarmament Commission, 
and several ad hoc committees); the Conference on Disarmament (a 40-member negoti-
ating body based in Geneva, affiliated with the U.N. but autonomous from it, which has 
served as the principal mechanism for the multilateral elaboration of treaty texts); the 
Department for Disarmament Affairs of the U.N. Secretariat (the focus of the Secretary-
General's activities in the field); and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Re-
search (an autonomous research institution). See [1988] 13 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 
8-13, U.N. Sales No. E.89.1X.5 (1988); Graham, A Brief Guide to the United Nations 
Disarmament Machinery, in Disarmament and World Development 227 (M. Graham, R. 
jolly & C. Smith eds., 2d ed. 1986). 
18. The terms "arms control" and "disarmament" refer to measures designed a) to 
make the outbreak of war less likely, b) to decrease the damage inflicted, if war does 
occur, and c) to reduce the economic burdens of peacetime preparations for war. See 
Luck, Placing Conventional Arms on the Multilateral Agenda, in Arms Control: The 
Multilateral Alternative 177, 182 (E. Lucked. 1983). Specialists sometimes differentiate 
between the two terms by reserving "disarmament" to refer to programs that would 
abolish, rather than simply control or limit, specified categories of weaponry. 
19. See Jaipal, Disarmament Negotiations: Multilateral and Bilateral, in U.N. Inst. 
for Disarmament Research, Interrelationship of Bilateral and Multilateral Disarmament 
Negotiations: Proceedings of the Baku Conference, june 2-4, 1987, at 7, 7-15, U.N. 
Sales No. GV.E/F.88.0.1 (1988) [hereinafter Proceedings of the Baku Conference]; U.S. 
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: 
Texts and Histories of the Negotiations 3-9 (1990) [hereinafter Texts and Histories of 
Negotiations]; Neidle, The Rise and Fall of Multilateral Arms Control: Choices for the 
United States, in Arms Control: The Multilateral Alternative, supra note 18, at 7, 8-17. 
20. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water, opened for signature Aug. 5, 1963, I4 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 
480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter LTBT]. The LTBT prohibits the testing of nuclear explo-
sive devices anywhere other than underground, where the deadly radioactivity will not 
leak into the biosphere. It currently has 116 parties. See Annexe A, Major Multilateral 
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1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)/1 and the 1972 Biological Weap-
ons Convention (BWC),22 among others23 have demonstrated that with 
respect to many military technologies, an effective disarmament mea-
sure will require the participation of nearly all of the states of the world. 
Notwithstanding the accomplishments of these treaties, however, 
the world remains a very dangerous place, with many of today's worst 
security nightmares springing not from superpower confrontations, but 
from the proliferation, or threatened proliferation, of uncontrolled so-
phisticated weapons and delivery systems to additional states.24 Those 
Arms Control Agreements, 1988 Stockholm Int'l Peace Res. Inst. (SIPRI) Y.B., World 
Armaments and Disarmament 549, 552 [hereinafter 1988 SIPRI Y.B.]. 
21. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 
1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.l.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]. The 
NPT obligates those of its parties that do not currently possess nuclear weapons to re-
frain from acquiring or developing them, and it also obligates the states that do already 
possess those weapons not to aid others in obtaining them, as well as to share the bene-
fits of nuclear technology and to curtail the nuclear arms race. The NPT currently has 
140 parties. See Goldblat, Nuclear Non-Proliferation: A Balance Sheet of Conflicting 
Trends, 20 Bull. Peace Proposals 369 (1989). 
22. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened 
for signature Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 [here-
inafter BWC]. The BWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, acquisi-
tion, or retention of biological agents or weapons, other than a small quantity for 
defensive research. It currently has 110 parties. See Annexe A, 1988 S1PR1 Y.B., supra 
note 20, at 553. 
23. Other noteworthy multilateral arms control agreements include the Environ-
mental Modification Convention of 1977 (Convention on the Prohibition of Military or 
Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques}, May 18, 1977, 31 
U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. No. 9614, 1108 U.N.T.S. 152 [hereinafter Environmental Modifica-
tion Convention] (banning the use of techniques of environmental modification in war); 
the Seabeds Arms Control Agreement of 1971 (Treaty on the Prohibition of the Em-
placement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed 
and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil-Thereof), Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. 
No. 7337, 10 I.L.M. 146 [hereinafter Seabeds Arms Control Treaty] (prohibiting deploy-
ment of nuclear weapons under the oceans); the Treaty ofTlatelolco of 1967 (Treaty for 
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America), Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 
[hereinafter Treaty of Tlatelolco] (declaring entirety of Latin America to be nuclear-
weapons-free zone); the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (Treaty on Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies}, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] (restricting military activities in outer 
space and on celestial bodies); the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 
T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinafter Antarctic Treaty] (declaring the conti-
nent reserved for peaceful purposes); and the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (Protocol for the 
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacte-
riological Methods of Warfare), June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 
L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol] (banning the first use of chemical weapons in 
war). See Texts and Histories of Negotiations, supra note 19, passim. 
24. "Low intensity warfare," defined as limited hostilities confined to a particular 
zone and usually designed to combat revolutionary guerrillas and regimes, has become 
increasingly important to United States military planning. See Barnet, U.S. Interven-
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who may have imagined that "peace is at hand" merely because of the 
superpower rapprochement may have been rudely surprised to dis-
cover the panoply of future military threats awaiting the economically 
developed states from a host of newly armed potential adversaries. 
First, regarding chemical weapons (CW), the leading countries are 
coming to realize that they, too, are vulnerable to insidious threats: 
upwards of twenty states are widely considered to possess lethal chemi-
cal arms, to be on the verge of developing them, or to have the capabil-
ity to produce them indigenously on short notice.25 Renegades such as 
Libya and North Korea are increasingly active in the CW arena,26 and 
Iraq overtly violated a long-standing international taboo by employing 
chemical ordnance widely, and with devastating effect, in the war with 
Iran.27 More recently, Iraq was reported to have loaded chemical 
weapons onto aircraft for possible use against American forces in Saudi 
Arabia.28 
Second, the potential for the imminent dispersal of nuclear weap-
onry has similarly escalated: Leonard Spector has calculated that while 
only five states are now acknowledged to possess nuclear arsenals, as 
tion: Low-Intensity Thinking, Bull. Atom. Scientists, May 1990, at 34, 34-37. At the 
same time, American exports of arms-including new high-technology weaponry-to 
the third world have escalated, see Husbands, A Buyer's Market for Arms, Bull. Atom. 
Scientists, May 1990, at 14, 14-16, and the indigenous weapons industries in many 
smaller states have expanded, see Ross, Do-lt-Yourself Weaponry, Bull. Atom. Scien-
tists, May 1990, at 20, 20-22. Overall, the number of heavily armed developing states 
has increased dramatically in recent years. See Klare, Wars in the 1990s: Growing Fire-
power in the Third World, Bull. Atom. Scientists, May 1990, at 9, 9-10; Walker, High-
Tech Killing Power, Bull. Atom. Scientists, May 1990, at 23, 23-26. 
25. See Summary ofU.S.-Soviet Agreement on Chemical Arms, N.Y. Times, June 2, 
1990, at 8, col. 2. Estimates about the rate of the spread of chemical weapons have 
varied widely, with some experts suggesting that as few as nine states now possess chem-
ical arms, and others, including the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, putting 
the tally as high as 20 or more. See Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons: 
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs and Its Permanent Sub-
comm. on Investigations, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1989) (statement of CIA Director 
William H. Webster); Chemical Arms Control After the Paris Conference, Arms Control 
Today, Jan./Feb. 1989, at 3, 4 (comments of Elisa Harris from transcript of press brief-
ing); Ember, Worldwide Spread of Chemical Arms Receiving Increased Attention, 
Chemical & Engineering News, Apr. 14, 1986, at 8, 8-16; Lundin, Robinson & Trapp, 
Chemical and Biological Warfare: Developments in 1987, 1988 SIPRI Y.B., supra note 
20, at 101, 101-02. 
26. Ember notes that only four states (United States, Soviet Union, France, and 
Iraq) have acknowledged possession of chemical weapons, but eleven more (Egypt, 
Syria, Libya, Israel, Ethiopia, Burma, Thailand, China, Taiwan, North Korea, and Viet-
nam) have also been reliably reported to have some degree of chemical warfare capabil-
ity. See Ember, supra note 25, at 8-16. 
27. See id.; Segal, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis, 66 Foreign Aff. 946, 
955-:-56 (1988); Smith, Relying on Chemical Arms, Wash. Post, Aug. 10, 1990, at A25, 
col. 1. 
28. See Gordon, Bush's Aims: Deter Attack, Send a Signal, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 
1990, at AI, col. 5, A9, col. 5. 
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many as ten others are on the threshold or pointed in the same hazard-
ous direction.29 Regional arms races in South Asia,30 the Middle 
East,3I Africa,32 and Latin America33 threaten to tilt still more states 
toward pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, with additional coun-
tries poised to join the exclusive "nuclear club," or being secret mem-
bers already.34 In 1990, during a period of tension between India and 
Pakistan over Kashmir, United States and Soviet intelligence agencies 
reported that both of those Asian nations appeared to be preparing to 
use nuclear weapons if hostilities broke out.35 
Third, as Janne Nolan and others have pointed out, the capability 
for delivering these awesome weapons to remote targets has also 
spread. During the 1980s, several new states tested or deployed for the 
first time missiles capable of projecting power at regional or even inter-
continental ranges.36 Iraq's successful use of missiles to cause terror in 
Iranian cities "has had an impact beyond Iran and Iraq," according to 
CIA Director William Webster: "The demand for ballistic missiles has 
increased among Third World governments .... By the year 2000 at 
least 15 developing countries will be producing their own ballistic mis-
29. See L. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb 3, 69, 161, 231-32 (1988); see also 
Goldblat, supra note 21, at 369-72 (discussing nuclear proliferation threat from Libya, 
Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Israel, and South 
Africa); Jones & Miiller, supra note 15, at 15-18 (surveying dangers of nuclear weapons 
spread in volatile areas of the world). 
30. See L. Spector, supra note 29, at 69-156. Nuclear competition between India 
and Pakistan has intensified, and both states maintain extensive nuclear programs; 
neither state probably has a fully assembled nuclear explosive, but both have marshalled 
all materials and technology necessary to fabricate them on short notice. See id. at 
69-70. 
31. See id. at 161-227 (Israel now probably possesses at least 50-60 nuclear weap-
ons, and Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Syria have all taken steps toward acquisition of atomic 
arsenals). 
32. See id. at 283-305 (South Mrica has probably compiled an arsenal of 10-20 
atomic weapons, and Nigeria has expressed an interest in obtaining nuclear arms). 
33. See id. at 231-79 (both Argentina and Brazil have continued substantial nuclear 
programs outside of any system of international monitoring or control; both have pur-
sued projects that could lead toward weapons capability). 
34. Cf. Gardner, supra note I, at 31 ("By the year 2000, there will be 40,000-
50,000 kilograms of separated plutonium in international commerce as a result of peace-
ful nuclear activities, a target for theft by terrorists and radical governments."); 
Milhollin, Attention, Nuke-Mart Shoppers!, Wash. Post, July 22, 1990, at C2, col. I (re-
cent relaxations of Western export controls will make it easier for third world states to 
acquire nuclear weapons capabilities). 
35. See Big 2 Said to Fear Subcontinent War, Wash. Times, May 28, 1990, at A2, 
col. 3; see also Reingold, India, Pakistan Political Changes May Spur Proliferation, Arms 
Control Today, Dec. 1989/]an. 1990, at 26, 26 (internal political pressures inside India 
and Pakistan may now drive both states to pursue nuclear weapons). 
36. See jones & Miiller, supra note 15, at 17-18; Morrison, Third World Missileers: 
New Threat?, 22 Nat'lJ. 969, 969 (1990); Nolan, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: 
The Limits of Nonproliferation, Arms Control Today, Nov. 1989, at 9, 9-10; Schrag, A 
New Genie Emerging, Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 25, 1988, at 14, col. 1. 
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siles."37 A state with ballistic missiles could inflict a devastating blow 
upon its neighbors or others, within minutes of a decision to launch, as 
and even most militarily developed states have deployed no effective 
national defenses against them.89 The future reality, according to 
American intelligence estimates, is one in which "ballistic missiles 
loaded with nuclear or chemical or biological warheads are a major fac-
tor of the conflicts in each region of the world."40 
Fourth, and perhaps most surprising, many developing states will 
be capable, within a decade, t:>f including another generation of ad-
vanced "conventional" weaponry in their arsenals.4 1 Even poor coun-
tries will be able to increase radically the destructive power of their 
armed forces by deploying inexpensive new cruise missiles made of 
lightweight composite materials. Guided by commercial navigation 
satellites (rather than by expensive on-board computer maps and map-
ping sensors),42 these devices will be capable of near-perfect accuracy, 
and they can be equipped with fuel-air explosive warheads of shocking 
37. Nuclear and Missile Proliferation: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Gov-
ernmental Affairs, IOlst Congress, 1st Sess. 11-12 (1989) [hereinafter Nuclear and Mis-
sile Proliferation] (testimony of CIA director William Webster); see also Gardner, supra 
note 1, at 31 ("There are 9 countries that have both missiles and chemical weapons, and 
that number could be as high as 15 or 20 by the year 2000. "). 
38. See Nolan & Wheelon, Third World Ballistic Missiles, 263 Sci. Am. 34, 39 
(1990). An intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) takes about 30 minutes to travel the 
3000 miles or more from its launch point to its target. See D. Barash, The Arms Race 
and Nuclear War 23 (1987). Shorter range ballistic missiles, such as those capable of 
reaching 500-2000 miles, have flight times on the order of 10-15 minutes. Cruise mis-
siles are much slower, flying only approximately as fast as modem airplanes. 
39. Regarding intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, both the United States and 
the Soviet Union have investigated various possible programs of defense against missile 
attack, and both have from time to time invested heavily in deployment of antiballistic 
missile interceptors, as well as in programs of anti-air defense, civil defense, and the like. 
At the present time, however, both superpowers, as well as every other state, are essen-
tially vulnerable to modem methods of ICBM attack. The United States and Soviet 
Union have therefore relied upon mutual deterrence, rather than active defenses, to 
render aggression improbable. But there is reason to doubt the credibility of the exten-
sion of these deterrence principles to all the newly emerging military forces around the 
world. See D. Barash, supra note 38, at 110-65; see also Diehl, Israel Tests Defensive 
Missile, Wash. Post, Aug. 10, 1990, at A25, col. 4 (Israel is experimenting with anti-
missile system designed to counter threat of incoming intermediate-range ballistic mis-
siles). 
Regarding intermediate-range ballistic missiles, the successes achieved by the 
United States' Patriot defense system in the Gulf War have suggested that interception 
(at least of relatively unsophisticated missiles) can be reliably achieved. See Farrell, The 
Patriot's Success Clouds Arms Debate, Boston Globe, Mar. 24, 1991, at AI, col. 5. 
40. Nuclear and Missile Proliferation, supra note 37, at 14 (testimony of CIA direc-
tor William Webster). 
41. SeeR. Cohen & P. Wilson, Superpowers in Economic Decline: U.S. Strategy 
for the Transcentury Era 183 (1990). 
42. See Nuclear and Missile Proliferation, supra note 37, at 28-29 (testimony of 
CIA director William Webster). 
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power.43 Like nuclear weapons, two or three fuel-air warheads will be 
able to obliterate a medium-size city,44 and there have already been 
indications that both Iraq and the United States have brandished these 
new weapons in the GulfWar.45 
These threats to industrialized societies and to their less industrial-
ized allies, suppliers, and trading partners will surely intensify in the 
coming years, and additional types of advanced weaponry that have to 
date been closely restricted may yet leak into the wider market.46 In-
deed, while it used to be quite rare for developed states to release their 
highly sophisticated arms to any developing states, those inhibitions 
have eroded.47 A pronounced upsurge in the military power of the de-
43. A fuel-air device "releases an aerosol cloud of explosive gas and then ignites it, 
creating an explosion nearly as powerful as a small atomic bomb." Stewart, Ballistic 
Missiles Reshape Power in Third World, San Francisco Chron., Mar. 7, 1990, at 1, col. 3. 
These devices were first used by the Soviet Union with devastating effect on Afghan 
rebel troop concentrations, and similar weapons have been included in the arsenal of 
the United States Air Force. See Sexton, New Soviet Bomb in Afghan War, Newsday, 
June 13, 1988, at 13, col. 1. 
44. "[U]nprotected humans have virtually no chance of survival" against fuel-air 
explosives, "seen by some experts as the most powerful conventional weapon of the 
[1990s]." Austin, Swedish Group Demands Protection Against Inhumane Weapons, 
Reuters Dispatch, Jan. 5, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT file). The superpowers 
are already designing an even more powerful second generation of these devices. See 
Kaylor, After INF, theNext New Arms Race, U.S. News & World Rep. May 9, I988, at 
26. 
45. See Apple, Iraq: Hidden Cards?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1991, at A12, col. 2; 
Barry, The Nuclear Option: Thinking the Unthinkable, Newsweek, Jan. 14, 1991, at 16, 
I7; Cody, Baghdad: Offer Has "No Effect" on Pace ofWar, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1991, 
at A1, col. I. 
46. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union have to date dominated 
the military uses of outer space, and the superpowers are the only states that have in-
vested heavily in programs designed to place weapons into orbit or to shoot down or 
disrupt the operation of another country's satellites. See Jasani, Military Use of Outer 
Space, 1988 SIPRI Y.B., supra note 20, at 75, 81-89. There can be no assurance, how-
ever, that this exceptionally destabilizing weapons technology wtll indefinitely remain 
out of the reach of other nations. See Dougherty, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer 
Space: A Perspective from the United States of America, in Proceedings of the Baku 
Conference, supra note 19, at 91, 91-98; Rodionov, Prevention of an Arms Race in 
Outer Space: Bilateral and Multilateral Perspectives, in Proceedings of the Baku Confer-
ence, supra note 19, at 108, 110-12. Indeed, many nations may soon be drawn into a 
race to perfect antisatellite weapons, as part of the pursuit of defenses against satellite-
guided cruise missiles, see supra text accompanying note 42. 
Similarly, the United States and its allies have a substantial advantage over the So-
viet Union-and even more of an advantage over the developing countries-in the tech-
nology necessary to produce the next generation of"smart" conventional weapons, and 
a variety of programs is underway to develop advanced radars, artillery shells, and other 
arms. See Canby, Conventional Weapon Technologies, 1987 S1PRI Y.B., supra note 8, 
at 85, 86-93. Again, however, the possibility remains that this technology will, over 
time, spread to other states. See Mohan & Subrahmanyam, High-Technology Weapons 
in the Developing World, in New Technologies for Security & Arms Control: Threats & 
Promise 229, 232-33 (E. Arnett ed. 1989). 
47. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the leading military states became increasingly 
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veloping states is underway, ushering in an era in which even the tradi-
tionally wealthy and powerful countries find themselves jeopardized as 
never before.4S 
In anticipation of these challenges, arms control negotiators are 
currendy grappling-with different levels of success-with issues as di-
verse as nuclear weapons testing,49 radiological weapons,50 conven-
tional forces, 5 1 and nuclear free zones, 52 while many other arms control 
problems are still lurking in the wings.53 Moreover, those same diplo-
mats are now scrambling to try to prevent the modest restrictions of an 
earlier generation of multilateral arms control accords-notably those 
willing to export even their more advanced weapons. See Indep. Comm'n on Disarma-
ment & Sec. Issues, Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival27-30 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter Palme Commission Report}. 
48. See Hoffman, U.S., Soviets to Press Arms Talks, Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 1990, at 
A31, col. 5. 
49. See Donovan, Unlimited Test Ban Treaty?, Arms Control Today, Apr. 1990, at 
30, 30; [1988] 13 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 201-22, U.N. Sales No. E.89.IX.5 (1988). 
50. See [1988] 13 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 306-20, U.N. Sales No. E.89.1X.5 (1988). 
51. Two new sets of multilateral negotiations are addressing questions related to 
conventional (i.e., nonnuclear) military weapons and personnel in Europe. The first 
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was signed in November 1990; it begins to 
reduce the levels of key military equipment on the continent. Under article XVlli, the 
parties are obligated to continue negotiations, with the goal of agreeing to further force 
reductions by 1992. See CFE Treaty, supra note 7, art. XVlll, 30 l.L.M. at 22. The 
Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in 
Europe (known as CDE) resumed deliberations in March 1989, and focused on prepar-
ing a set of agreements to increase the "transparency" of each state's military apparatus 
via advance notifications of military maneuvers and invitations to foreign observers, on 
the theory that those measures-even without any direct reduction in the size of the 
armies-could reduce fears about a surprise attack, and thus minimize the need to as-
sume the worst about ambignous behaviors. See Borawski, From Stockholm to Vienna: 
Confidence- and Security-Building Measure~ in Europe, Arms Control Today, May 
1989, at 11, 15. These negotiations are expected to be demanding and difficult, with a 
great many tricky and unprecedented issues awaiting resolution. See Hirschfeld, The 
Toughest Verification Challenge: Conventional Forces in Europe, Arms Control Today, 
Mar. 1989, at 16, 16. In addition, negotiations regarding conventional forces may arise 
in other geographic contexts. See Segal, Informal Arms Control: The Asian Road to 
Conventional Reductions, Arms Control Today, May 1989, at 11, 16. 
52. See [1988] 13 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 234-53, U.N. Sales No. E.89.IX.5 (1988); 
Hoffman, Shevardnadze Urges Nuclear-Free Zone in Middle East, Wash. Post, Dec. 12, 
1990, at A29, col. 1. 
53. See, e.g., [1988] 13 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 344-53, U.N. Sales No. E.89.IX.5 
(1988) (recounting efforts to promote multilateral agreement on reciprocal reduction of 
military budgets); U.N. Dep't for Disarmament Affairs, Reduction of Military Budgets: 
Refinement of International Reporting and Comparison of Military Expenditures, Re-
port of the Secretary-General, Study Series 10, at 37-38, U.N. Doc. NS-12/7 (1983) 
(studying procedures for reporting and cutting military spending); Fieldhouse, The 
Case for Naval Arms Control, Arms Control Today, Feb. 1990, at 9, 14-15 (argning that 
United States should now begin to include limiting naval forces and activities in multilat-
eral arms control processes). See generally Goldblat, Multilateral Arms Control Efforts, 
1988 SIPRI Y.B., supra note 20, at 34 7, 357- 58, 364-65 (summarizing progress in vari-
ous ongoing multilateral negotiating efforts). 
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of the NPT54 and the BWC55-from unraveling under the pressure of 
unanswered questions about verification and compliance. 
In light of these diverse pressures, no state-no matter how 
wealthy or sophisticated its economy-can reasonably feel very confi-
dent in its security or in the prospects for its future safety, and the de-
veloped states are particularly exposed.56 This century has witnessed 
an escalating pattern of international and internal violence, as wars 
have become more common, more protracted, and more deadly, in all 
sectors of the globe, jeopardizing developing and developed societies 
alike. 57 
54. Under the NPT, the parties hold a review conference every five years to assess 
the operation of the treaty; after 25 years, "a conference shall be convened to decide 
whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an addi-
tional fixed period or periods." NPT, supra note 21, art. VIII, § 3 & art. X, § 2, 21 
U.S.T. at 492-94, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, at 10-12, 729 U.N.T.S. at 174-75. The 25-year 
evaluation is scheduled for 1995, and although the NPT has become the cornerstone of 
the international effort to stem the further spread of nuclear weapons, several states 
have hinted that they may not support a long-term extension of the treaty. Many devel-
oping states consider that the superpowers and other developed states have not fully 
complied with their NPT obligations to arrest their own nuclear arms race and to share 
the benefits of civilian nuclear power, see infra notes 164-172 and accompanying text. 
Recent review conferences have therefore become quite contentious, and the 1995 con-
ference may entail substantial international bargaining. See Dunn, Nuclear Proliferation 
Watch: Some Thoughts on Future Challenges, in New Technologies for Security & 
Arms Control: Threats & Promise, supra note 46, at 91, 96, 100-01; Mayorsky, The 
Evolving International Consensus on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, in New Technologies 
for Security & Arms Control: Threats & Promise, supra note 46, at 85, 89, 91-92; Gra-
ham, The Duration of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Sudden Death or New 
Lease on Life?, 29 Va.J. Int'l L. 661, 661-66 (1989). 
55. The BWC has been ensnarled in a controversy regarding American allegations 
about an outbreak of anthrax near the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk, reportedly the site of a 
secret BW facility that suffered a serious accident in 1980. The inability to resolve these 
concerns satisfactorily has led to proposals to amend the treaty substantially to 
strengthen its verification provisions. ln addition, new biotechnologies related to re-
combinant DNA have surfaced, challenging the coverage of the existing treaty language, 
and leading to other proposals for renegotiations to enhance the BWC's scope. See 
Goldblat, The Review of the Biological Weapons Convention, 1987 SIPRI Y.B., supra 
note 8, at 409, 410-11; Review Conference Held on Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention, 86 Dep't St. Bull. No. 1247, Dec. 1986, at 40, 42-43. 
56. See Chidzero, Disarmament and Development: The Implications for Africa, 
Disarmament, Spring 1986, at 8, 14: 
The world cannot be secure when the rich and prosperous constitute an island 
in a sea of poverty. They may well be armed to the teeth, girded with all the 
paraphernalia of sophisticated weaponry, nuclear and conventional, yet it must 
be increasingly clear that these can only be used effectively at the risk of self-
destruction, instantaneous retaliation and, in the process, destruction of the 
environment. 
See also Holm, World Disarmament: A Strategy for Development?, Disarmament, 
Spring 1986, at 26, 29 ("All states live in an insecure world and share a common 
vulnerability."). 
57. One authoritative source has identified 36 major ongoing armed conflicts in the 
world, compared with only three in 1945. See Wilson & Wallensteen, Major Armed 
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A paralyzing variety of scenarios will confront future military plan-
ners in the United States and elsewhere. First, as noted, there is the 
heightened specter of direct attack: long-range aircraft and missiles 
now put all countries directly within reach of antagonistic forces, and 
geographic separation-even the buffer of wide oceans- provides only 
limited protection. ss 
Second, even if they are not attacked directly, the developed coun-
tries will still be placed at risk whenever traditional allies or regional 
affiliates come under fire. For the United States, the dollar costs and 
numbers of American casualties resulting from being drawn into battle 
in order to assist a friendly state in resisting aggression could be much 
higher than in the past as a result of more sophisticated weaponry be-
ing used against U.S. forces.59 
Third, the developed states inevitably will suffer when advanced 
types of arms cause remote regional conflicts to intensify, as commerce 
is disrupted and innocent bystanders are drawn in. 60 The collateral 
damage from future fighting could be considerable, especially when the 
sides begin to target each other's industrial production and economic 
bases. 
Moreover, as Elisa Harris has warned, when advanced weapons 
proliferate still further, the chances increase that terrorist organizations 
will acquire them, exposing all states to new types of imponderable 
threats.61 The world already has experienced its relative powerlessness 
in the face of determined subnational groups, especially state-spon-
Conflicts in 1987, 1988 SIPRI Y.B., supra note 20, at 285, 285-98. Several wars have 
shown a trend toward increasing levels of violence, destruction, and fatalities. See R. 
Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1989, at 22, 23 (1989). 
58. See L. Spector, supra note 29, at 27-59; lnt'l lnst. for Strategic Studies, The 
Military Balance 1987-1988, at 92-200 (1987). 
59. See Nolan & Wheelon, supra note 38, at 34 (noting that Argentina used French-
supplied Exocet missile to sink British cruiser during 1982 Falklands war, and that Iraq 
nearly sank United States destroyer with same system during Iran-Iraq War in 1987). 
60. For example, the United States was drawn into the Iran-Iraq war by the need to 
sustain the How of oil through the Persian Gulf. Eleven Kuwaiti tankers were reffagged 
in 1987 as United States vessels, coming under the protection of the American Navy and 
inserting United States forces into the conflict. See Michael H. Armacost, U.S. Policy in 
the Persian Gulf and Kuwaiti Reffagging, Statement Before Senate Foreign Relations 
Comm., reprinted in 87 Dep't of State Bull. No. 2125, Aug. 1987, at 78, 79. 
61. See Chemical Arms Control After the Paris Conference, supra note 25, at 4. 
Similarly, American willingness to provide modern Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to rebel 
forces in Afghanistan, Angola, and Chad has aroused concerus that the deadly technol-
ogy could spread to other states or possibly to terrorists. See Cooper, Sandza & Cullen, 
A Busy Swarm of Stingers, Newsweek, Nov. 23, 1987, at 44, 44. 
The Soviet Union recently removed nuclear weapons from its southern republics, 
where they might more easily have fallen into the hands of dissident or nationalistic 
forces. See Wines, Soviets Are Said to Pull Nuclear Arms From Some Restive Regions, 
N.Y. Times, june 23, 1990, at 4, col. 1; Soviets Shift A-Arms from Tense Regions, L.A. 
Times, June 23, 1990, at A4, col. 4. But see Soviets Deny Shifting A-Weapons, L.A. 
Times, june 27, 1990, at AIO, col. 5 (Soviets claim no such shifts had occurred). 
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sored terrorists; the dispersal of more sophisticated types of weapons 
will only exacerbate the existing strains.62 
Finally, the developed states are jeopardized in a more subtle, but 
perhaps more profound way, as the spread of modem weaponry 
reduces their ability to use, or credibly to threaten to use, military force 
in legitimate contexts, such as the assistance to self-determination and 
the resistance to aggression. As all states become more imperiled by 
the spread of sophisticated weaponry, each will lose a measure of its 
autonomy, having to live with the fear that any untoward national pol-
icy might provoke deadly, unanticipated retaliation "from some 
quarter.63 
The wealthy states will not be able to counter these diverse future 
threats through any of the usual techniques that have ensured their se-
curity in the past. Tactics such as simply procuring additional hard-
ware,64 writing more treaties of alliance,65 or propounding familiar 
theories of deterrence and strategy,66 which may have worked in the 
62. The United States Central Intelligence Agency is becoming particularly con-
cerned about terrorists obtaining stockpiles of chemical and biological weaponry be-
cause those arms do not require the same degree of technological sophistication as 
nuclear explosives, and because they are so easy to transport with low risk of detection. 
See Nuclear and Missile Proliferation, supra note 37, at 20-21 (testimony of CIA director 
William Webster). 
63. See Nolan & Wheelon, supra note 38, at 40. 
64. The Bush administration has signaled its intention to use the American stock-
pile of chemical weapons as a "bargaining chip" in two ways in future disarmament 
negotiations. First, the United States will destroy 80% of its existing CW devices even 
prior to conclusion of a comprehensive international agreement, but will retain the re-
maining 20% "to have some leverage" to induce others to reduce too. See Devroy, 
Bush Says Strategic Arms Pact Likely Next Year, Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1989, at A4, col. 6 
(quoting President Bush). Second, even under the anticipated treaty, the United States 
will seek to retain two percent of its chemical arms to provide an incentive to hold-out 
states to become parties to the convention. See Institute for Defense and Disarmament 
Studies, Arms Control Reporter, Apr. 1990, at 704.B.422. It is possible, however, that 
these types of "incentives" will backfire, driving states away from the flawed treaty re-
gime, rather than into it. 
65. Networks of alliances, various types of security assurances (promises never to 
use nuclear weapons against specified states, or promises to come to the aid of states 
attacked by nuclear weapons), and other ancillary security measures often have been 
advanced to help deal with the dangers of proliferation by enhancing states' sense of 
security and removing some of the fears that might otherwise prompt them to pursue 
deadly new arms. See V. Utgoff, Neutralizing the Value of Chemical Weapons: A Sup-
plement to Chemical Weapons Arms Control 1 (Atlantic Council of the United States 
Occasional Paper 1989) (on file with Columbia Law Review). None of these strategies, 
however, has proven sufficient to deal with the threat of the spread of advanced weap-
onry, and there is little prospect that they will become dramatically more effective in the 
future. See D. Fischer, The International Non-Proliferation Regime 1987, at 46-49 
(U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research 1987). 
66. See generally The International Politics of Deterrence (B. Buzan ed. 1987) 
(presenting variety of perspectives on international logic and practice of deterrence the-
ory in various settings). 
The superpowers' retention of significant stockpiles of nuclear and other weapons 
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Cold War era, will be largely unavailing in the future age. Instead, 
some new types of security arrangements will have to replace those that 
sufficed for a generation to deal with the "old," inexorably bipolar, 
kinds of confrontations. The developed states, in short, need multilat-
eral arms control, encompassing all states. 67 To achieve this symmetric 
reduction in' global military capacity, they need the cooperation of the 
developing world-real, voluntary cooperation this time, not the by-
product of superpower hegemony. 
II. THE NEED FOR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
These days, economic conditions are tough all over. Every state is 
grappling with the challenges of budgetary limitations, demands for in-
creased domestic social services, and mounting international obliga-
tions. There are many legitimate claimants for the public largess, and 
no shortage of projects toward which increased funding usefully could 
be directed. 68 
But the need for development69 assistance to the third world is of a 
deeper, more profound nature; it is a moral and economic imperative, 
not just something vaguely placed on a "wish list" of projects that 
would be nice to attend to some day. The gap between the wealthy and 
the poor states continuously widens; statistics regarding average life ex-
pectancy, per capita income, literacy, and other indicia of human dig-
nity consistendy reflect a world in which pockets of relative wealth are 
will, of course, continue to help deter other states from launching attacks against them. 
But analysts now question the extent to which the threatened first use of nuclear weap· 
ons-with the profound dangers such a course would unleash upon the entire planet-
still serves as a credible response to the use of conventional or chemical attack. See 
Bundy, Halperin, Kaufinann, Kennan, McNamara, O'Donnell, Sigal, Smith, Ullman & 
Warnke, Back from the Brink, Atlantic, Aug. 1986, at 35, 35. 
67. Of course, the developed states will have to accept a greater measure of dis· 
armament for themselves too. They cannot plausibly argue that pursuit of advanced 
weaponry is acceptable for some states but not for others; as long as the leading military 
powers continue to act as if their security depends upon possession of chemical, nuclear, 
and other arms, it is not surprising that the developing states continue to harbor similar 
ambitions and strategies. See Deger, The United Nations International Conference on 
the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1988 SIPRI Y.B., supra note 
20, at 517, 524-25. 
68. See Matlack, Domestic Lobbies Trying to Cash In, 22 Nat'lj. 884 (1990) (iden-
tifying numerous domestic American agencies and interests that have suffered funding 
cutbacks in recent years and are now competing for shares of the federal budget); see 
also Beilenson, Never Give Money Away to Anyone, Nat'l Rev., July 24, 1981, at 841, 
841 (arguing that United States should not allocate public funds for foreign charitable 
aid when America's own budget deficit is so large). 
69. The concept of "development" is an elusive one, embracing social and eco· 
nomic changes to raise per capita income and improve standards ofliving. Rough statis-
tical indices of the standard of living can be found in average life expectancy, literacy, 
infant mortality, nutritional availability, and other considerations. See A Programme for 
Survival, supra note 2, at 23, 48; Deger, supra note 67, at 519. 
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sustained in the midst of crushing poverty, hunger, and deprivation.70 
Local and regional arms races swallow resources unproductively and 
jeopardize the fleeting opportunities for achieving real growth and 
stability. 71 
Outside assistance is required to help the poor states crawl out 
from their current desperate situation; few, if any, would be able to 
transform themselves into modem industrialized societies without sub-
stantial infusions of money, know-how, and management advice.72 
Even a relatively modest amount of foreign intervention, if skillfully 
planned and consistently maintained, could have a sizeable catalytic im-
pact; in subsistence economies, a dollop of assistance can be stretched 
surprisingly far if conditions are favorable.73 
70. Statistics about the depth and pervasiveness of poverty in the third world are 
hard to contemplate. See Final Document, Int'l Conference on the Relationship Be-
tween Disarmament and Development, New York, Aug. 24-Sept. II, 1987, ~ 26, re-
printed in [1987] 12 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 372, 375, U.N. Sales No. E.88.IX.2 (1987) 
("In developing countries, it has been estimated that close to 1 billion people are below 
the poverty line, 780 million people are undernourished, 850 million are illiterate, 1.5 
billion have no access to medical facilities, an equally large number are unemployed, and 
I billion people are inadequately housed."); see alsoP. Harrison, The Third World To-
morrow: A Report from the Battlefront in the War Against Poverty 108-09, 212, 256 
(2d ed. 1983) (describing destitution of poverty in developing countries); A Programme 
for Survival, supra note 2, at 30-32, 49-50, 54-58 (gap is immense between wealthy and 
poor states in all areas of human well-being); Deger, supra note 67, at 517-19 (develop-
ing world contains over three-quarters of world's population, but less than one-fifth of 
its total production, consumption, and investment of wealth). 
71. See L. Spector, supra note 29, at 11-12 (developing countries have profound 
interest in avoiding regional arms races that could sap their resources and erode global 
norm against spread of threatening weaponry); A Programme for Survival, supra note 2, 
at 14, 117-18 (noting economic tradeoffs between military and social spending, such as 
cost of one modern tank equalling cost of 1000 school classrooms or of improved stor-
age facilities for 100,000 tons of rice); Adeniran & Stoffer, Mrica and Arms Control: A 
New Perspective, 17 Stan.J. Int'l L. 163, 164-65 (1981) (indigenous arms producers and 
the influence of foreign suppliers often divert African states' attention from economic 
growth, causing them to pour scarce resources into wasteful military spending); 
Fontanel, The Main Economic and Political Aims of an International Disarmament Fund 
for Development, in U.N. Inst. for Disarmament Research, Establishment of an Interna-
tional Disarmament Fund for Development 159, 163-64 (1984) [hereinafter Interna-
tional Disarmament Fund] (spending on military items and activities does not promote 
economic growth as much as other allocations of national budgeting would). 
72. See P. Harrison, supra note 70, at 326-28; Bota, Preface, in International Dis-
armament Fund, supra note 71, at 5; see also Lewis, Poorest Countries Seek Increases in 
Aid, N.Y. Times, july 3, 1990, at A3, col. 4 (42 poorest states ask world's richest nations 
for debt relief, aid, and markets for their produce). But see P.T. Bauer, Reality and 
Rhetoric: Studies in the Economics of Development 43-47 (1984) (foreign aid does not 
help poor countries develop, but only disrupts patterns of economic growth that other-
wise would evolve more productively); A Programme for Survival, supra note 2, at 126, 
139 (developing countries themselves must take lead in devising strategies for economic 
growth). 
73. See Dep't of Political and Security Council Affairs, U.N. Centre for Disarma-
ment, Report of the Secretary-General, The Relationship Between Disarmament and 
Development 90, U.N. Doc. A/36/356 (1981) [hereinafter Disarmament and Develop-
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A substantial, regularized program offoreign aid, moreover, would 
advance the self-interest of the donor states of both East and West, as a 
strategic investment in future security and commerce.74 By promoting 
stronger local economies in developing states, the contributing state 
builds relationships with potential suppliers of some products and po-
tential customers of others. 75 By encouraging a more hopeful eco-
nomic outlook, the developed world reduces some of the tensions and 
grievances that might promote the growth of totalitarian, and poten-
tially aggressive, governments. 76 By propping up debt-ridden econo-
ment] (an increase of five percent in aid to developing countries is indispensable mini-
mum for acceptable economic growth there); Salam, What the Third World Really 
Needs, Bull. Atom. Scientists, Nov. 1988, at 8, 8-10 (noting how even relatively small 
programs of scientific and technological assistance can make a difference in developing 
countries); see also J. Baker, Imperatives of Economic Reform: Change in Soviet and 
East European Economies, Testimony Before House Ways and Means Committee, Apr. 
18, 1990, reprinted in U.S. Dep't of State Current Policy No. 1270, at 1 (suggesting that 
American assistance can play important role in speeding Soviet Union and Eastern Eu-
ropean states into political and economic reform). 
74. The philosophical origins of the American foreign aid program can be traced to 
the post-World War II efforts to blunt Soviet expansionism and promote American busi-
ness interests by strengthening the market economies around the globe. See Sewell & 
Contee, Foreign Aid and Gramm-Rudman, 65 Foreign Aff. 1015, 1015 (1987). 
75. See W.W. Rostow, Rich Countries and Poor Countries: Reflections on the Past, 
Lessons for the Future 116 (1987) (exports from developed states to developing states 
have increased dramatically in past two decades); Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of 
State, Gist: U.S. Prosperity and the Developing Countries 1-2 (Sept. 1989) (developing 
countries purchased $95 billion worth of United States manufactured products in 1988, 
about 40% of total American merchandise exports, and they supplied over half the 
United States imports of several critical primary products) (on file with Columbia Law 
Review). Economic progress, or the lack thereof, in the developing states can have a 
profound impact upon the American economy too. For example, when the world exper-
ienced a general economic downturn from 1980 to 1985, the developing states in partic-
ular suffered, and they purchased far fewer American and other goods on the global 
market. Over half of the decline in United States exports during this period resulted 
from decreased third world demand, and nearly 1. 7 million American jobs-in indus-
tries ranging from heavy machinery to agriculture-were lost as a result of the develop-
ing states' recession. See Sewell & Contee, supra note 74, at 1018-19; see also P. 
Harrison, supra note 70, at 151 (economic aid to developing countries will indirectly 
increase their purchases of donor's exports); Stanfield, Fixing Foreign Aid, 20 Nat'l J. 
1223, 1225 (1990) (evaluating proposals to link foreign aid with credits to American 
exporters). But see P.T. Bauer, supra note 72, at 54-55 (arguing that foreign aid does 
not generally increase recipient's purchases of donor state's exports). 
76. See A Programme for Survival, supra note 2, at 16 ("While hunger rules, peace 
cannot prevail. He who wants to ban war must also ban mass poverty."); Bota, supra 
note 72, at 5; Sollie, Institutional, Technical and Political Aspects of an International 
Disarmament Fund for Development, in International Disarmament Fund, supra note 
71, at 59, 86; Pipart & Sada, The Establishment of an International Disarmament Fund 
for Development: The Regional Approach, in International Disarmament Fund, supra 
note 71, at 89, 132; Maynes, If the Poor Countries Go Under, We'll Sink with Them, 
Wash. Post, Sept. 18, 1983, at Cl, col. 1 (economic downturns in many developing 
countries in recent years may trigger a chain of violent revolutions comparable to those 
in Great Depression era, when violence overthrew democratic governments from Viet-
nam to Nicaragua). But see Sollie, supra, at 66 (in some instances, as in Iran under the 
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mies, the capital-exporting states can help safeguard their own banking 
systems from collapse and protect the system ofintemational finance.77 
By underwriting economic growth, the donor may even ease pressures 
that might otherwise force local farmers and businesses into activities 
related to the drug trade. 78 
Nevertheless, these factors have not occasioned much international 
generosity-at least not nearly enough to make a sufficient dent in the 
problem. 79 As long as the impulse for foreign aid is driven only by 
these rather evanescent considerations of charitable obligation or long-
run self-interest, the instinct to give will not flourish. As Richard 
Gardner has observed, "The idea of international assistance to help the 
less developed countries develop their human and material resources 
... has received declining real financial support in recent years, except 
where immediate security interests have been predominant."80 · 
Under these circumstances, foreign aid for economic development 
will continue to be a fringe item in national budgeting, provided only 
when the spirit moves the donor state,81 and it will never become a 
Shah, ill-conceived and rash development may actually lead to increased social unrest at 
local, national, and international levels); Mearsheimer, supra note 10, at 46 ("democra-
cies are every bit as likely to fight wars as are authoritarian states"). 
77. See Pipart & Sada, supra note 76, at 131. But see P.T. Bauer, supra note 72, at 
60 (opposing foreign aid used as policy tool to sustain capital exporting states' banks). 
78. See Brooke, Peru Develops Plan to Work with U.S. to Combat Drugs, .N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 25, 1991, at A2, col. 3; Gugliotta, Agencies' Spat Blocks Plan for Reducing 
Coca Crops, Wash. Post, June 27, 1990, at Al7, col. 3; cf. Swardson, S. America Trade 
Plan Proposed, Wash. Post, Nov. 2, 1989, at A53, col. 6 (United States resistance caused 
demise of emerging multilateral coffee-trade treaty; resulting deadlock led to precipi-
tous fall in world coffee prices, eliminating important alternative crop for farmers who 
might now cultivate coca (raw material used for making cocaine)). 
79. In the early post-World War II years, foreign aid was a large and popular part 
of national budgets. By 1951, the Western democracies were allocating almost 1% of 
their gross national product to that purpose. Later, however, aid levels declined precip-
itously. See infra note 80 and accompanying text; infra note 84. In 1971, the United 
Nations set a target for each developed state to allocate 0.7% of its gross national prod-
uct to foreign aid, but few states have even attempted to sustain that level, and none has 
consistently reached it. See Disarmament and Development, supra note 73, at 30-31; P. 
Harrison, supra note 70, at 310-12, 324. 
Foreign aid has become among the least popular items in American budgeting, and 
an increasing proportion (66% in 1987) of the annual aid package consists of military 
aid (equipment, training, etc.) rather than economic assistance that would be useful for 
development. See Sewell & Contee, supra note 74, at 1022; Stanfield, supra note 75, at 
1224; Zintl, The Cost of Friendship, Time, Feb. 11, 1985, at 33. 
80. Gardner, supra note 1, at 32; see also Maynes, supra note 76, at Cl, col. 1, C2, 
col. 5 (American officials suffer from "policy fatigue" toward economic development, 
and "any appeal to the humanitarian instinct of the American people and particularly 
the American policy community is likely to fail"). 
81. The United States provides foreign aid to 102 countries, but in most instances 
the package provided is far too small to make a major dent in the problems. The United 
States has allocated to foreign aid one of the lowest percentages among Western coun-
tries, while spending 6% of its national income on defense-higher than any other 
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reliable, sizeable program of international transfers.82 For example, at 
the most recent major international meeting on the subject, the Sep-
tember 1990 Second United Nations Conference on the Least Devel-
oped Countries, the major donor states effectively resisted efforts to 
establish a worldwide goal (even a goal without any binding legal com-
mitments behind it) of providing to the poorest countries official devel-
opment assistance equivalent to 0.20 of one percent of the donor 
states' respective gross national products (GNP).83 Without some 
stronger type oflegal obligation, therefore, the third world simply can-
not count on adequate levels of assistance from the developed 
countries. 84 
Western nation. See Obey & Lancaster, Funding Foreign Aid, Foreign Pol'y, Summer 
1988, I4I, I49-50. 
For fiscal year I99I, the United States will supply a total of$I5.4 billion in foreign 
aid, down from $20.9 billion in I985. As in previous years, the bulk of the funds (almost 
one-third of the total) will go to Israel and Egypt, with the new governments of Eastern 
Europe also receiving substantial funding, thus leaving less support left over for the 
poorest developing countries. See Doherty, A Reluctant Congress Passes $I5 Billion 
Assistance Bill, Cong. Q, Weekly Rep., Nov. 3, I990, at 3730, 3730-31. In recent years, 
less than one-quarter of United States bilateral development assistance has been 
programmed for the lowest-income countries. See Obey & Lancaster, supra, at 149. 
The Soviet Union, too, has put domestic concerns ahead of foreign aid: in I989, 
Soviet military assistance to third world countries fell to $I7 billion, down from $19 
billion the year before, and leading officials have indicated that Moscow will be placing 
less emphasis on its relationships with developing countries due to the demands of polit-
ical reform in Eastern Europe and inside the U.S.S.R. See Soviets Plan to Review Mili-
tary Aid, Wash. Post, May 27, I990, at A27, col. I. 
Even Sweden, probably the leading state in donating foreign aid and promoting 
international cooperation for development, has experienced periods when domestic 
economic conditions caused it to reduce its international giving. See Sollie, supra note 
76, at 75. 
82. Multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank also have played a major role in assisting poor countries in economic develop-
ment, and the quantity of funds made available through these organizations has in-
creased. See Rowen, Third World Debt Problems Worsen, Report Shows, Wash. Post, 
Sept. I8, I989, at A22, col. I; Stevens, Pressure on World Bank to Save the World, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. II, I989, at A9, col. I. These resources, however, are far from sufficient to 
meet the developing countries' needs, and political wrangling over the allocation system 
has also troubled many of the programs. See Rowen & Mufson, Rich Nations Back 
Boost In Aid to Poor Countries, Wash. Post, May 7, I990, at A20, col. 1. 
83. See Greenhouse, Poor Nations Get Unspecified Pledge of More Aid, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. I6, I990, at 4, col. I. The first U.N. conference, in 1981, had established a 
goal of O.I5 of I% of GNP for international assistance directly targeted toward the 
neediest recipient states, and some Scandinavian countries and Holland have already 
exceeded that level. The United States, however, has provided only 0.04 of 1% as offi· 
cial development aid to the poorest developing countries, and japan (the second largest 
donor in absolute terms) has given only 0.07 of I%. See id.; see also supra note 81 
(describing overall levels of foreign aid, beyond development assistance accorded to 
poorest countries). 
84. Cf. Sewell & Contee, supra note 74, at 10I8 ("Unfortunately, development pro· 
gress has virtually halted since I980. Mounting debt, falling commodity prices and slug-
gish global trade flows have devastated many Third World economies."); Dewar, Voices 
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Ill. THE NEED FOR STRONGER INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
In this Part, we consider some of the ways in which future arms 
control agreements are likely to be systematically different from-and 
even more challenging than-the generation of treaties already negoti-
ated. We also evaluate the world's existing treaty mechanisms for cop-
ing with international problems and disputes, and assess how those 
institutions repeatedly have failed to deal effectively with even the rela-
tively simple demands of the current generation of disarmament issues. 
Finally, we suggest the various approaches that individual states might 
take in evaluating arms control proposals, including our own, in decid-
ing whether to join a new disarmament regime. 
A. Future Directions in Arms Control 
The next wave of arms control agreements will include certain 
characteristics that impose still greater burdens upon the negotiators 
and implementors, intensifying the existing shortcomings. The first 
characteristic is the participation of so many states in the bargaining 
process, states who will proceed largely independently, with less auto-
matic deference to the superpowers than in earlier years.85 Agreement 
between the United States and the Soviet Union is still a critical ele-
ment,S6 of course, but increasingly the leadership in the disarmament 
negotiations arises from other sources, as the rest of the world shows 
less patience with American or Soviet hesitancy.87 
Second, a related feature is the growing equality of the parties; fu-
Rise as Foreign Aid Does Not, Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 1990, at A50, col. 1 (there are many 
claimants for increased foreign aid, but the total pool of available support is not grow-
ing); Goshko, Old Allocations, New Order Hard to Reconcile, Wash. Post, May 17, 
1990, at A1, col. 1 (same). 
85. For many earlier multilateral arms control agreements, the negotiation process 
began with an essentially bilateral phase, as the United States and Soviet Union ad-
dressed and resolved all the critical issues on a one-to-one basis, and then presented 
their joint product to the international community for possible modification and ap-
proval by as many states as possible. This was the process that produced the BWC, the 
Outer Space Treaty, the Seabeds Arms Control Treaty, and the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. See Texts and Histories of Negotiations, supra note 19, at 53, 90-92, 108, 
129-31. The Treaty ofTlatelolco, on the other hand, was negotiated essentially among 
the Latin American states, with countries outside the region playing a smaller role. See 
Texts and Histories of Negotiations, supra note 19, at 64-65. 
86. Cf. Goldblat, Multilateral Arms Control Efforts, 1987 SIPRI Y.B., supra note 8, 
at 383, 383 (in 1986, Committee on Disarmament failed, for ninth consecutive year, to 
reach agreement on any item on its negotiating agenda despite efforts of international 
community, due to arms control impasse between United States and Soviet Union). 
87. Cf. Neidle, supra note 19, at 21 (nonaligned states "are no longer prepared to 
play the role of neutral catalysts seeking patiently to promote progress by more 'impor-
tant' powers"). As noted by Abram Chayes, American chair of the Technical Coordinat-
ing Committee of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation: 
if we want a regime governing the terms and conditions of international access 
to nuclear fuel, facilities and technology, it will have to be a regime that is inter-
nationally formulated and has the concurrence of all m~or affected interests. 
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ture treaties are very unlikely to adopt the model of the NPT, which 
ratified a permanent legal distinction between those states that already 
possess nuclear weapons and those that do not. 88 Instead, the next 
generation of treaties will insist that the parties' respective rights be in 
parity and that their corresponding obligations be parallel, if not rigidly 
identical.89 
A third probable aspect of future treaties will be their attempt to 
focus attention on real disarmament, rather than on partial or interim 
measures that tend simply to confirm in writing the parties' previous 
independent national intentions.90 Increasingly, states have come to 
The day when the United States or any other country could impose its will on 
these matters is over. 
Dombey, International Agreements on Nuclear Weapons, Bull. Atom. Scientists, Mar. 
1982, at 36, 38. 
More starkly, the initiative for calling the recent international conference to con-
sider amending the LTBT to expand it into a comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests 
came from a collection of nonnuclear weapons states. Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri 
Lanka, and Yugoslavia took the lead in galvanizing world public opinion on the issue, 
over the opposition of the United States. See Baker, Nations Plan Nuclear Test Ban, 
Def. News, Aug. 8, 1988, at 4. 
88. The "basic bargain" of the NPT committed the "nuclear weapons states" 
(NWS) (those that had already conducted a nuclear explosion by Jan. I, 1967) to share 
the civilian benefits of nuclear power and to negotiate future restraints on their nuclear 
arms race. In return, the "non-nuclear weapons states" (NNWS) agreed never to ac-
quire their own nuclear weapons. This exchange, therefore, legitimates the retention of 
an important military capability by one group of states, while denying that same power 
to others. This aspect of the treaty was regarded, even by some of the negotiators for 
the nuclear weapons states, as "one of the 'greatest con games of modern times.' " W. 
Epstein, The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control 118 (1976). 
Many NNWS-including some that have no lingering nuclear aspirations of their 
own-have criticized this aspect of the NPT as discriminatory, and have sought a more 
even-handed solution to constrain the nuclear arsenals of all states simultaneously. See 
D. Fischer, supra note 65, at 29; Goldblat, supra note 21, at 370. 
89. In the negotiations toward a comprehensive chemical weapons disarmament 
convention, competing possibilities for asymmetric reductions to be made by different 
states have been advanced, without much general acceptance. The United States has 
indicated that it will retain a small but significant CW arsenal until all other states capa-
ble of producing chemical arms have adhered to the treaty and dismantled their stock-
piles. See supra note 64. France, on the other hand, has proposed that the nations now 
possessing large CW stockpiles should be required to dismantle them as soon as possi-
ble, while the parties with lesser chemical weapons investments should be able to sustain 
them, as a security hedge, for up to ten years. See Marshall, Progress on a Chemical 
Arms Treaty, 238 Science 471, 472 (1987). Neither approach is likely to be nearly as 
popular as a treaty calling for parallel reductions by all participants. 
90. Some early multilateral arms control agreements were not very significant mili-
tarily because they merely confirmed the parties' separate intentions to refrain from pur-
suing certain weapons options that seemed expensive, unreliable, or impractical for 
other reasons. Thus, a primary motivation for the BWC was the American conclusion 
that biological weapons had very low military utility in any event. See Texts and Histo-
ries of Negotiations, supra note 19, at 129-32. Similarly, no states yet have the capacity 
to manipulate the environment as a tool of warfare or to exploit the seabed for impor-
tant military advantage, so the Environmental Modification Convention and the Seabeds 
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realize that halfway measures are inadequate-they channel or redirect 
an arms race, but do not preclude it. Future agreements thus are likely 
to be more militarily meaningful than their predecessors, imposing 
constraints that significantly impinge upon defense plans and options 
that states might otherwise exercise.91 
Associated with this feature will be even greater concern with the 
intrusiveness of the verification arrangements, as the parties demand 
and accept augmented procedures for ensuring compliance.92 The In-
termediate Nuclear Forces (1NF)93 and Conventional Forces in Europe 
(CFE) treaties94 and the nascent .CW treaty95 are the prototypes and 
leading edges of this· trend, demonstrating a punctilious concern with 
Arms Control Treaty were relatively easy to conclude, since they did not close off any 
viable short-term military possibilities. See Texts and Histories of Negotiations, supra 
note 19, at 107-10, 211-13. The long-term value of such treaties sometimes may prove 
more considerable, however. For example, the Outer Space Treaty bans the placement 
into orbit of nuclear weapons. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 23, art. IV, 18 U.S.T. at 
2413, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, at 4, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208. Within 15 years of its conclusion, 
scientists had begun work on a variety of space-based laser weapons driven by nuclear 
explosions, but the treaty stands as an important legal impediment to the deployment of 
any such "Strategic Defense Initiative" devices. See A. Sherr, Legal Issues of the "Star 
Wars" Defense Program 21 (Lawyers Alliance Issue Brief 3, 1984). 
91. The BWC, see supra note 22, and the INF Treaty, see infra note 93, were the 
first arms control accords to eliminate totally an entire category of weapons, rather than 
simply to restrict the size of the residual arsenals that the powers could retain. The 
chemical weapons treaty that is currently under negotiation will have a similar character, 
seeking to abolish entirely the chemical weapons capabilities of participating states. See 
Preliminary Structure of a Convention on Chemical Weapons, preamble, art. I, re-
printed in Conference on Disarmament, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical 
Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament, CD/1033, Aug. 1990, app. I, at 19,20-22. 
Unlike its predecessors in the field of strategic arms control, the nascent START 
agreement will contain substantial reductions in the superpowers' modern interconti-
nental-range nuclear arms, rather than merely capping the growth of the arsenals. See 
Arms Treaty: The Outlook, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1990, at 4, cols. 5-6. 
92. The international community has long recognized that verification is an integral 
part of any sound arms control agreement. A preeminent element in all recent multilat-
eral negotiations has been the necessity for establishing procedures through which all 
parties to a disarmament treaty could be confident that the obligations were being fully 
implemented by all participants. See [1988] 13 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 121, 136, U.N. 
Sales No. E.89.IX.5 (1988). 
93. The INF Treaty (Treaty on the Elimination oflntermediate-Range and Shorter-
Range Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987; United States-U.S.S.R., 27 I.L.M. 90 [hereinafter INF 
Treaty]) contained verification provisions of unprecedented intrusiveness, mandating 
on-site inspections at 118 locations inside the United States, the Soviet Union, and their 
respective European allies over a period of 13 years. See id., art. V, 27 I.L.M. at 95-96; 
Dean, The INF Treaty Negotiations, 1988 SIPRI Y.B., supra note 20, at 375, 387. 
94. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe includes a detailed Pro-
tocol on Inspection, providing for extensive on-site inspections, including surprise in-
spections, throughout Europe. See CFE Treaty, supra note 7, 30 I.L.M. at 52-66. 
95. The forthcoming chemical weapons convention is now under negotiation 
within the 40-member Conference on Disarmament, a United Nations affiliate charged 
with responsibility for developing multilateral arms control initiatives. The current draft 
"rolling text" of an agreement has evolved over several years of deliberations; it now 
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inspection privileges and manifesting the negotiators' abilities to elabo-
rate the necessary verification provisions in careful text with unprece-
dented rigor.96 The world will never again return to the era when 
important arms control accords contained no verification provisions 
whatsoever,97 or even to the more recent era when "national technical 
means of verification" alone were deemed sufficient to monitor compli-
ance.98 Instead, future arms control accords inexorably will expose 
many more hitherto private details about the parties' defense struc-
tures, military-industrial capacity, and private businesses.99 
Further, it is predictable that many future multilateral arms control 
treaties will include provisions establishing international implementa-
tion bodies to supervise an international inspectorate and to adjudicate 
reflects substantial areas of agreement, but several significant barriers still remain. See 
Conference on Disarmament, supra note 91. 
96. The chemical weapons convention will evoke a massive system of inspections 
and reporting requirements, as the international apparatus gains mandatory access to 
chemical weapons production and storage facilities (and also to other, civilian plants 
that could be converted to weapons purposes). See Preliminary Structure of a Conven-
tion on Chemical Weapons, arts. IV, V, reprinted in Conference on Disarmament, supra 
note 9I, app. I, at 29-3I, 32-34. 
97. The Geneva Protocol, supra note 23, the LTBT, supra note 20, and the BWC, 
supra note 22, were all silent regarding procedures for monitoring the parties' perform-
ance of their obligations, and each state implicitly undertook to perform unilaterally the 
degree of monitoring that it considered appropriate. 
98. Some important treaties have relied exclusively or mainly upon verification by 
"national technical means" (NTM). The SALT I Interim Agreement on the Limitation 
of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, I972, United States-U.S.S.R., art. V, 23 U.S.T. 
3462, 3465, T.l.A.S. No. 7504, at 4 [hereinafter SALT I Interim Agreement]; the ABM 
Treaty, see supra note 4, art. XII, 23 U.S.T. at 3443, T.l.A.S. No. 7503, at 9-10; and the 
SALT II Treaty (Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms),June 18, I979, 
United States-U.S.S.R., art. XV, I8 I.L.M. III2, I 134-35 (signed but not ratified) [here-
inafter SALT II Treaty], contain virtually identical language recording the parties' 
agreement to use NTM in compliance with international law, not to interfere with the 
other party's NTM, and not to use deliberate concealment measures that impede verifi-
cation by NTM. 
The United States and Soviet Union have not expressly defined NTM or identified 
the systems that are included within it, but it is generally taken to comprise photorecon-
naissance satellites, ground based radars, long-range seismometers, and other compara-
ble equipment. See Richelson, Technical Collection and Arms Control, in Verification 
and Arms Control 169, I69 (W. Pottered. 1985). 
99. Military facilities and activities will of course continue to be of the utmost con-
cern in future arms control agreements, but as the weapons being regulated become 
smaller, more mobile, and capable of being produced and stored in ordinary-appearing 
commercial buildings, the arms control inspection regime will of necessity begin to in-
trude increasingly into business premises and even homes. Chemical weapons, for ex-
ample, may be manufactured in a great many facilities that are now producing 
pharmaceuticals, plastics, fertilizers, and the like, so an effective verification mechanism 
will have to expose those operations. Cf. Tanzman, Constitutionality of Warrantless 
On-Site Arms Control Inspections in the United States, 13 Yale J. Int'l L. 21, 29-66 
(I988) (surveying legal issues arising from contemplated inspection processes of chemi-
cal weapons convention). 
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(or at least to find facts) after suspicions of treaty violations.100 
Finally, future treaties are likely to require a substantial degree of 
international consensus in order to enter into force, 101 as states will be 
reluctant to accept important military obligations in isolation, without 
corresponding limitations being imposed upon rivals. A typical multi-
lateral agreement might specify that it will not become operational until 
some very high percentage of the nations of the world (including, per-
haps, all militarily significant countriesi02) adheres. IOS Alternatively, an 
100. The ABM Treaty established a Standing Consultative Commission, see ABM 
Treaty, supra note 4, art. Xlli, 23 U.S.T. at 3444-45, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 10-11, and 
the lNF Treaty established a Special Verification Commission, see INF Treaty, supra 
note 93, art. XIII, 27 I.L.M. at 97, to facilitate the parties' discussion of compliance 
issues. However, these institutions were not created as independent organizations; each 
government controls its own delegation and all decisions require unanimity, so the com-
missions operate more like negotiating delegations. The forthcoming chemical weapons 
convention, in contrast, would create an international bureaucracy endowed with a de-
gree of autonomy. This body would, to some extent, develop its own powers and func-
tions outsic;le the control of individual member states. See Preliminary Structure of a 
Convention on Chemical Weapons, art. Vlll, reprinted in Conference on Disarmament, 
supra note 91, app. I, at 38-46. 
101. Some multilateral arms control agreements, such as the Environmental Modi-
fication Convention, have required specified threshold numbers of participants before 
the treaty would enter into force for any state. See Environmental Modification Conven-
tion, supra note 23, art. IX.3, 31 U.S.T. at 340, T.I.A.S. No. 9614, at 8, 1108 U.N.T.S. at 
155 (requiring deposit of instrument of ratification with Secretary-General of U.N. by 20 
governments). Others, such as the Geneva Protocol, have not defined a required 
number of initial parties. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 23, 26 U.S.T. at 575, T.I.A.S. 
No. 8061, at 5, 94 L.N.T.S. at 71; see also Antarctic Treaty, supra note 23, art. XIII, 12 
U.S.T. at 800, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, at 7, 402 U.N.T.S. at 82-84. 
102. For example, the chemical weapons treaty that is now under negotiation was 
originally contemplated to include a comprehensive, permanent ban on all chemical 
weapons and related activities, but the United States has recently taken the position that 
until the treaty is joined by all states that are capable of producing chemical weapons, 
the. United States will retain a small chemical weapons stockpile as a reserve deterrent. 
See Feinstein, Mystery Surrounds 'Fire' at Libyan Chemical Plant, Arms Control Today, 
Apr. 1990, at 26. The CFE Treaty will enter into force only when ratified by all22 o(its 
negotiating states. See CFE Treaty, supra note 7, art. 22, 30 I.L.M. at 23. 
Other multilateral arms control negotiations have provided that the treaty will not 
enter into force until it has been ratified by all three of the major powers (typically, the 
United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, who often acted as negotia-
tors and depositaries). See the LTBT, supra note 20, art. III.3, 14 U.S.T. at 1318, 
T.I.A.S. No. 5433, at 6, 480 U.N.T.S. at 47 (requiring three original parties); the Outer 
Space Treaty, supra note 23, art. XIV.3, 18 U.S.T. at 2419, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, at 10, 610 
U.N.T.S. at 211 (requiring those three, plus at least two more); and the NPT, ;;upra note 
21, art. IX.3, 21 U.S.T. at 492, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, at 10, 729 U.N.T.S. at 174 (requiring 
those three, plus forty others). 
103. See Thee, Modalities for the Establishment of an International Disarmament 
Fund for Development: Vision and Political Feasibility, in International Disarmament 
Fund, supra note 71, at 48; cf. Marshall, supra note 89, at 473 (very restrictive chemical 
weapons treaty might drive away 12 to 15 ambivalent nations, and some leading officials 
conclude that chemical weapons agreements joined by only a few big countries would 
hardly be worth the effort). 
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agreement might include clauses under which it would automatically 
terminate unless acceded to by a designated number of countries, or by 
specified individual countries, within a certain number of years. 104 
B. Current Shortcomings 
All of these new features will place additional burdens upon a sys-
tem that has to date proven itself ineffective for coping with even the 
relatively lower level of demands posed by existing arms control ac-
cords. These defects have been revealed in existing arms control re-
gimes in each of the three critical phases of a treaty's life: negotiation, 
implementation, and enforcement. 
1. Negotiation, Signature, and Adherence. - To date, there has simply 
been too little incentive for all the important states to participate in the 
negotiations, to help shape the treaty regime, to join it once it has been 
created, and to sustain membership throughout the life of the agree-
ment. States naturally ask "What's in it for me?" and the international 
community has not regularly been able to provide a sufficiently tempt-
ing response. 
The participants in multilateral arms control are, after all, a diverse 
lot, with radically different interests, fears, and capabilities; it is always 
difficult to fashion a mutually acceptable package of trade-offs that is 
even-handed without being procrustean. In some states, a natural affin-
ity for the objectives of arms control- coupled, perhaps, with intense 
lobbying from allies and other champions of the treaty-will suffice, but 
for others, the international political "credit" that they earn from par-
ticipation in the treaty will not be worth much, especially if their impor-
tant regional rivals remain aloof. 
Each arms control regime has had to deal-none very success-
fully- with "problem countries," those that hold out against an emerg-
ing consensus and thereby undercut it.l05 In some instances a "free 
104. The trilateral (United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom) negotiations 
toward a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty from 1977-1980 proceeded without the 
participation of two other acknowledged nuclear weapons states, France and the 
People's Republic of China (PRC). The negotiators hoped eventually to develop a 
formula for drawing those two powers (as well as all other countries) into the treaty 
regime when it was completed, knowing that a test ban that embraced only three of the 
nuclear weapons states was not likely to be durable. See H. York, Making Weapons, 
Talking Peace: A Physicist's Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva 301-02 (1987). 
105. For example, a major concern regarding the NPT-which has been joined by 
140 states-concerns the proliferation dangers posed by "nuclear threshold countries," 
such as Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa, that have refused to 
adhere to the treaty and that conduct significant nuclear activities and operate facilities 
capable of covertly producing weapons-grade materials. See D. Fischer, supra note 65, 
at 17; Goldblat, supra note 53, at 358. 
Similarly, the LTBT has not been signed by, inter alia, France, PRC, and Cuba, and 
other countries such as Pakistan and Argentina waited over 20 years between signing the 
treaty and ratifying it. See Texts and Histories of Negotiations, supra note 19, at 44, 48, 
50; L. Spector, supra note 29, at 312. 
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rider" of this sort may gain the benefits of others' sacrifices-it shares 
the security advantages that accrue when its neighbors reliably pledge 
to foreswear certain threatening military hardware-without paying the 
price of assuming offsetting restraints itself. 106 In other instances the 
holdout may have only the illusion of a free ride, as the cost of sus-
taining the military option makes it more a burden than a benefit107-
but the practice can nonetheless jeopardize other states' continued fe-
alty to the less-than-complete treaty regime.108 And in many instances, 
the potential holdouts have found it advantageous to "tease" treaty 
supporters, by wavering indefinitely on the precipice of pursuing the 
dangerous weapons, in the hopes that fear will eventually cause the 
arms controllers to "up the ante" and provide even greater benefits, 
adjunct to those of the treaty itself, to lure the threshold states into the 
fold. 109 
Worse than that, inclusion in arms control agreements in the mod-
em era has become quite expensive financially for the parties, 110 and 
significant budgetary disincentives have emerged that actually serve to 
106. See W. Baumol & A. Blinder, Economics: Principles and Policy 792 (3d ed. 
1985); c£ Treverton, Managing the Alliance Politics of Multilateral Arms Control, in 
Arms Control: The Multilateral Alternative, supra note 18, at 73, 75-78 (describing 
opportunities for "free riding" by allies, who might rhetorically support calls for grandi-
ose disarmament proposals, knowing that United States will inject reality necessary to 
prevent excesses). 
107. Nuclear weapons and other advanced arms can be very expensive to develop 
and deploy, and can incite local arms races in which higher spending by jealous or fear-
ful neighbors provokes still greater commitments of resources on all sides. See, e.g., 
Kennedy, Nonproliferation as a Fundamental Policy Goal, 87 Dep't St. Bull. No. 2129, 
Dec. 1987, at 77, 77-80; see also Deger & West, Introduction: Defence Expenditure, 
National Security and Economic Development in the Third World, in Defence, Security 
and Development 1 (S. Deger & R. West eds. 1987) (noting tradeoff for developing 
countries between spending national income on military affairs or on social needs and 
economic development). 
108. The Treaty ofTlatelolco, supra note 23, art. xxviii, 634 U.N.T.S. at 352-54, 
for example, has elaborate procedures requiring all the states in Latin America to join 
the treaty before it enters into force for any of them, but also permitting states to waive 
that condition in favor of immediate effectiveness. To date, 23 states have filed the 
waiver; Brazil and Chile have ratified the treaty but not waived the condition; Argentina 
has signed but not ratified; and Cuba alone among the eligible states has refused to sign 
the treaty. See D. Fischer, supra note 65, at 30. 
109. The United States, for example, has provided immense military and other 
assistance to Pakistan, which has long sustained a thinly veiled nuclear weapons develop-
ment program. American officials were motivated in part by the hope that if Pakistan 
received sufficient aid to feel confident about its conventional military forces, it might 
have less incentive to procure nuclear arms. However, this American aid-not being 
tied to specific actions on the part of Pakistan-seems to have afforded the United States 
precious little leverage. See Goldblat, supra note 21, at 380-81; Note, Nuclear Non-
Proliferation for the 80s: Carrot and Stick Policy Reexamined, 13 Brooklyn]. Int'l L. 25, 
42-47 (1987). 
110. Of course, some states can save money by refraining from building and de-
ploying the weapons that are regulated by a disarmament agreement, see supra note 
107. But other states would not have proceeded with those weapons programs anyway, 
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drive potential states away from participation.111 The high-technology 
verification systems, based on satellites or other devices, are frightfully 
expensive. 112 The cost of mounting and of hosting frequent on-site 
inspections also can be substantial.113 Compliance with the detailed 
recordkeeping and security demands of treaties will consume personnel 
and other resources that could usefully be dedicated elsewhere.114 And 
Will Carpenter and Kyle Olsen of the Chemical Manufacturers Associa-
tion have identified a novel additional cost element that has been added 
so the treaty produces no tangible savings for them, yet they will still have to bear their 
shares of the costs of the verification apparatus. 
111. For example, the safeguards regime of the NPT is applied more rigidly against 
states that are parties to the treaty than against states that hold out. For parties, the 
safeguards are applied on all nuclear activities, whereas for nonparties, safeguards apply 
only to the particular items being imported, and indigenously developed capacities may 
remain unencumbered. This discrimination may not be a major cost element driving 
states away from the arms control regime, but it certainly is an incentive that is pointed 
in the wrong direction. See Goldblat, supra note 21, at 373. 
112. The new generation of United States "Lacrosse" satellites, equipped with syn-
thetic-aperture radar, permitting all-weather, around-the-dock intelligence gathering, 
will cost over $500 million each, with a total system price tag as high as $12 billion. 
Even the United States has balked at spending those sums for treaty verification and 
other monitoring. See Bunn, Spy Satellite Controversy Resolved, Arms Control Today, 
May 1989, at 23. 
113. The budget for the United States On-Site Inspection Agency, the bureau es-
tablished to implement the verification provisions of the INF Treaty, has grown to $50 
million for fiscal year 1990, with a staff of 223. See Morrison, Trusting, But VerifYing, 
21 Nat'lj. 2580, 2581 (1989). 
In some other arms control situations, the costs of verification have undercut or 
altered the negotiations. In the talks aimed at producing an "Open Skies" agreement to 
permit unimpeded aerial reconnaissance, for example, Czechoslovakia has said that it 
would not have, and could not procure, the aircraft necessary to perform the permitted 
overflights, and Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg have expressed the intention to 
pool their resources and conduct the inspection flights as a joint enterprise to save 
money. See Adams, Smaller Countries Hope to Reduce Open Skies' Cost, Data Limits, 
Def. News, Feb. 19, 1990, at 8. 
114. In the chemical industry, for example, the United States, like most other coun-
tries, already requires private firms to maintain detailed accounts of all aspects of their 
operation and to file numerous reports related to pollution control, use of toxic sub-
stances, employee health and safety, and the like. See Carpenter, Government Regula-
tion of Chemical Manufacturing in the USA as a Basis for Surveillance of Compliance 
with the Projected Chemical Weapons Convention, in 2 The Chemical Industry and the 
Projected Chemical Weapons Convention: Proceedings of a Stockholm International 
Peace Research 1nstitute/Pugwash Conference (5 SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare 
Studies) 11, 11-24 (1986) [hereinafter Pugwash Conference]. These voluminous re-
cordkeeping requirements would be greatly expanded under the verification standards 
of an arms control agreement. 
Similarly in the nuclear power industry, the imposition of international safeguards 
to monitor the use of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology, in order to guard 
against possible diversion to weapons purposes, has proven expensive. Some plants 
have complained that they are placed at a competitive disadvantage compared to rivals 
who are able to operate without the incumbrance of treaty inspections. See D. Fischer, 
supra note 65, at 21. 
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by treaties, such as the emerging CW convention, 115 that touch heavily 
upon the activities of private industry: There is now a significant dan-
ger that foreign or international inspection t:ould expose closely 
guarded trade secrets (such as production processes, customer lists, 
and patterns of copsumption of raw materials) redounding, through an 
untraceable process of industrial espionage, to the competitive disad-
vantage of the inspected state.116 
In sum, many states reasonably fear that if they join one of the 
important current or future arms control agreements, they will be polit-
ically, militarily, or financially disadvantaged in comparison with those 
who resist limitations upon armaments.117 
2. Implementation.- Similarly, the implementation phase of mod-
em arms control treaties seems almost as if it were contrived to push 
states away from the treaty's objectives, rather than strategically to pro-
mote them. Too many treaties have proven inadequate at instilling par-
ties' confidence in the regime's power to monitor rivals' behavior, to 
investigate ambiguities, and to resolve doubts about compliance. 
Verification of each party's fulfillment of its obligations is an essen-
tial aspect of arms control: no state is willing to restrain its own pursuit 
of self-defense options unless it is assured that potential antagonists are 
similarly shackled.118 Yet some multilateral arms control agreements 
have either ignored the subject altogether or dealt with it inade-
115. See supra note 95. 
116. The fear of exposing valuable trade secrets has been the single biggest con-
cern that the American chemical industry has expressed about the new chemical weap-
ons convention, and the negotiators have devoted considerable attention, as well as 
explicit provisions in the draft treaty text, to the problem of preserving confidentiality. 
Industrial rivalry has prompted fears that foreign inspections, ostensibly justified for 
purposes of arms control treaty verification, will actually be employed to pirate irre-
placeable commercial confidences. See Carpenter, supra note 114, at 22-23; Hoffmann, 
Some Aspects of Verification from the Viewpoint of the Chemical Industry of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, in 2 Pugwash Conference, supra note 114, at 97, 97-104; The 
Spy in the Ointment for Negotiators, New Scientist, jan. 14, 1989, at 27; see also Prelim-
inary Structure of a Convention on Chemical Weapons, Annex on the Protection of 
Confidential Information, reprinted in Conference on Disarmament, supra note 91, app. 
I, at 77-82, (obligation to protect confidential information should prevent divulging 
anything but that necessary to implement convention). 
117. The arms control process, to date, has not saved its parties much money; the 
treaties have not foreclosed many viable options that would have attracted substantial 
funding even in the absence of international restrictions. See International Disarma-
ment Fund, supra note 71, at 20. The countries that have dominated the negotiations-
principally the United States and the Soviet Union-have been motivated primarily by 
considerations of military security, rather than cost, and have not paid much attention to 
the possibility that disarmament could release funds for development purposes. See 
Sollie, supra note 76, at 68. 
118. For example, several lingering questions regarding the Soviet Union's compli-
ance with the obligations of multilateral and bilateral arms control agreements have 
proven to be highly controversial, with the United States government asserting that 
"[c]ompliance with arms control commitments remains an essential element" of arms 
control policy, and that violation "undermines the confidence essential to an effective 
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quately.119 The implementation of these accords repeatedly has been 
troubled by the difficulty of assessing compliance:120 the procedures 
for gathering first-hand data about activities in the troubled locale have 
been too easily frustrated. 121 Parties know that they can conveniently 
circumvent the purpose of the inspection, through subtle dilatory tac-
tics or through incomplete support for the cooperative aspects of the 
verification measures, without necessarily violating the letter of the 
legal agreement, and that they can do so with relative impunity. 122 
3. Enforcement.- The most glaring shortcoming in existing arms 
control, as Phillip Trimble has noted, is the paucity of options available 
to an innocent state, or to the community of parties as a whole, when 
there is reliable evidence of a treaty violation.123 International law af-
fords only an impoverished range of alternatives, none ofwhich may be 
well suited to the particular provocation. Under the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, 124 an aggrieved state may terminate a 
arms control process in the future." Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agree-
ments, President's Report to the Congress, Dec. 1988, at 3, 4. 
119. The Geneva Protocol, supra note 23, the BWC, supra note 22, the Seabeds 
Arms Control Treaty, supra note 23, and the Environmental Modification Convention, 
supra note 23, all lack explicit, effective provisions regarding verification and 
enforcement. 
120. Even the NPT inspection regime, which has been the most long-standing and 
widespread program of international verification, is far from satisfactory. The Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has responsibility for maintaining the safe-
guards and materials accountancy standards under a series of international agreements, 
has never been accorded the staffing and legal powers necessary to do a thorough job. 
States retain the powers, for example, to refuse to admit particular inspectors, to pre-
clude samples being taken outside the country for analysis, and to decline to have new 
types of surveillance and monitoring equipment installed. Similarly, the IAEA has little 
power to conduct surprise or short-notice inspections. See D. Fischer, supra note 65, at 
37-45; Goldblat, supra note 21, at 373. 
I21. Investigations into allegations of treaty noncompliance typically must confront 
both political and technical hurdles. In many instances the suspected state has been 
extremely reluctant to open itself to foreign scrutiny, and has inhibited the search for 
evidence. In addition, the physical proof of the use of banned weapons may be elusive 
and ephemeral, as indications of illegal activity (lingering chemical traces perhaps indic-
ative of weapons usage, for example) decay relatively rapidly, or may be difficult to dis-
tinguish from naturally occurring agents. See Harris, Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain, Int'l 
Security, Spring 1987, at 41, 44, 45, 79, 80, 87; Altman, Poison Gas Attacks: Why a 
Diaguosis Is So Difficult, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1988, at 14, col. 3. 
122. Cf. Dombey, supra note 87, at 36 ("unless arrangements can be made quickly 
to strengthen these [nuclear nonproliferation} agreements and especially their monitor-
ing and enforcement, then it may be too late to redress the situation in view of the 
increasing number of states who have or will shortly have access to nuclear weapon 
materials"). 
123. See Trimble, Beyond Verification: The Next Step in Arms Control, 102 Harv. 
L. Rev. 885, 889-91 (1989). 
124. Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention}. The Vienna Convention is not in force for the United 
States, but the State Department has declared that most of the treaty's contents are 
nonetheless binding upon the United States as expressions of customary international 
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treaty, or suspend its operation in whole or in part, upon a material 
breach of the obligations by another state125-but this use of negative 
sanctions would ordinarily lead to a dismantling of the treaty, rather 
than to the restoration of compliance, thus effectively ending the treaty 
regime that the innocent party presumably was endeavoring to sustain. 
Other "remedies" available in international practice are similarly 
inept. A party may typically withdraw from an arms control regime 
when its "supreme national interests" have beenjeopardized by devel-
opments related to the treaty,126 but that, too, does not help restore 
the status quo ante. A party may take other unilateral action, outside 
the treaty, to offset the putative advantages that the cheater has ob-
tained, but this course can be expensive and time-consuming.I27 The 
dispute may be taken to the United Nations, 128 to various diplomatic 
law. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Intro-
ductory Note to Part Ill: International Agreements at 144-45 (1986). 
125. See Vienna Convention, supra note 124, art. 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346. A 
material breach is defined as an unwarranted repudiation of the treaty or "the violation 
of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty." 
Id. art. 60, 11 3(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346. The treaty has no provisions explicitly dealing 
with remedies for lesser types of breaches. 
126. The ABM Treaty specifies that each party has, on six months' notice, "the 
right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the 
subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." ABM Treaty, 
supra note 4, art. XV, 112, 23 U.S.T. at 3446, T.l.A.S. No. 7503, at 12. Similar language 
has been written into other arms control agreements. See SALT II Treaty, supra note 
98, art. XIX.3, 18 I.L.M. at 1158; CFE Treaty, supra note 7, art. XIX, 11 2, 30 I.L.M. at 
22. 
127. For example, if one country believed that its treaty partner was deploying new 
combat aircraft in excess of the number permitted by treaty, it could elect to respond by 
building for itself additional antiaircraft radars and missiles, thereby preserving its own 
record of full treaty compliance, while still denying to the cheater the apparent advan-
tages of the additional aircraft. These defensive procurements, however, would require 
additional time and money, and would not necessarily move the parties closer toward 
the type of military balance that the treaty originally contemplated. See Smith, Reagan 
Given Options on Soviet Radar Issue, Wash. Post, Nov. 18, 1988, at A34, col. 1 (when 
Soviet Union refused to dismantle illegal ABM radar at Krasnoyarsk, United States con-
sidered options such as reversing planned retirement of several aged Poseidon nuclear 
submarines). 
128. In both the Environmental Modification Convention and the BWC, for exam-
ple, parties undertake to consult with each other, including cooperating within the 
framework of the United Nations, to resolve treaty-related problems. Further, any state 
that believes that another party is violating the treaty is authorized to lodge a complaint 
with the Security Council. See Environmental Modification Convention, supra note 23, 
art. V, 11 1, 3, 31 U.S.T. at 337, 338, T.I.A.S. No. 9614, at 5, 6, 1108 U.N.T.S. at 153, 
154; BWC, supra note 22, arts. V, VI, 111, 26 U.S.T. at 588, T.l.A.S. No. 8062, at 6, 1015 
U.N.T.S. at 167. 
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channels, 129 to the court of world public opinion, 130 or to existing in-
ternational judicial or arbitral panels, 131 but these have not often 
proven to be especially effective fora. Invoking economic sanctions or 
other international pressures has some attraction, but in many in-
stances that process has proven to inflict more pain upon the state that 
imposes the controls than on the intended victim.132 The extreme op-
tion, military or covert force, is also unlikely in the long run to prevent 
the dispersion of new arms technology or the deployment of advanced 
weaponry.133 
In short, the range of responses to a treaty violation is often too 
blunt or too ineffective: as a practical matter, the innocent state may 
have to choose between destroying the treaty regime in toto or acquiesc-
ing in the illegitimate behavior.134 Even when the world has been gen-
129. In addition to the usual ambassadorial channels that may be used to make 
demarches regarding treaty compliance issues, the United States and Soviet Union have 
established dedicated dispute-resolution bodies under some arms control agreements. 
These institutions are given mandates to discuss confidentially issues related to compli-
ance and to exchange information related to performance of the treaty obligations. See 
ABM Treaty, supra note 4, art. Xlll, 23 U.S.T. at 3444-45, T.l.A.S. No. 7503, at 10-11; 
INF Treaty, supra note 93, art. XIII, 27 I.L.M. at 97. 
130. The United States publicized its findings regarding the alleged use of "yellow 
rain" chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and its 
allies during the early 1980s, in an attempt to marshall world public opinion against the 
Soviets. See Harris, supra note 121, at 57-62. Similarly, the United States has issued 
annual compliance reports describing in detail asserted Soviet violations of various arms 
control agreements. See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Soviet Noncom-
pliance, ACDA Publication No. 120 (Mar. 1986). 
131. The International Court of justice could hear a case alleging treaty violation if 
the parties agreed to refer the case there. See Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 36, 11 2, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993, at 30. The ICJ, 
however, has not proven to be a very powerful body, especially in cases involving na-
tional security matters. SeeJ. Sweeney, C. Oliver & N. Leech, The International Legal 
System 44-69 (3d ed. 1988). 
132. The post-World War II record of the imposition of economic sanctions in-
cludes frequent instances when attempts to influence the policies of other nations were 
ineffective, due to noncooperation or evasion by other states, as well as cases where 
sanctions backfired, inflicting greater losses on the domestic United States economy 
than on the target state. See B. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving 
the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime 10-31 (1988); Mufson, Sanctions Could Be Two-
Edged Sword, Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 1990, at AI7, col. I. 
133. In 1981, Israel launched a surprise air strike against nuclear installations near 
Baghdad that the Israelis feared would be used in support of an Iraqi nuclear weapons 
program. The attack destroyed the facility, causing a substantial delay in any Iraqi weap-
ons development plans, but al~o provoked worldwide condemnation. See Council Con-
demns Israel's Air Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 18 U.N. Chron., Aug. 1981, at 5, 
5-6; S.C. Res. 487, 36 U.N. SCOR (2288th mtg.) at 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (1981). 
The United States has considered the use of military force against the Libyan chemi-
cal weapons facility at Rabta but has not launched a strike that would destroy the facility 
or impede its functioning. See Feinstein, supra note 102, at 26. 
134. In the long-rnnning dispute regarding the Soviet Union's construction of a 
radar facility near the Siberian city ofKrasnoyarsk, for example, the Reagan Administra-
tion was persuaded that the installation was a violation of the ABM Treaty, see supra 
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uinely convinced that illegal, shocking behavior has occurred-as with 
Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq Warl35-few countries 
have been able to find ways to bring effective leverage to bear.136 
C. National Calculations 
Overall, each state will do its own cost/benefit calculation, on an 
ongoing basis, about an arms control treaty, weighing the attractions 
and the disincentives in determining over time whether to sign, comply 
with, violate, or abrogate the accord. 137 International practice in recent 
years has revealed certain repeated patterns of state behavior in this 
area, and three groups of states generally may be identified. First, 
some states will be predisposed to join any significant arms control 
agreement, and they will exert political pressure on others to associate 
themselves with it, too. Although the attitudes of foreigners, even pow-
erful and friendly foreigners, will not cause the leaders of any country 
to take unjustified risks with national security, world public relations 
can be a substantial factor influencing the thinking of most national 
leaders and the behavior of their states.138 A "bandwagon effect" may 
note 4, but found itself without an effective recourse. Repeated protests to Soviet offi-
cials brought no satisfactory resolution, and internal reviews of American options were 
unable to identify any broader range of policy choices. Similarly, when the U.S.S.R. 
raised questions about the legality of certain American radar installations, the treaty did 
not offer suitable avenues for resolving the issue. Cf. Morrison, Radar Diplomacy, 19 
Nat'l J. 17, 20 (1987) (describing ambiguity of treaty); Earle & Rhinelander, The 
Krasnoyarsk Radar: A 'Material Breach' of the ABM Treaty?, Arms Control Today, 
Sept. 1988, at 9, 9-11 (even if United States were to declare radar a material breach of 
treaty, United States would acquire no additional rights or opportunities that would 
benefit national security in any way). 
135. Iran had complained about Iraqi poison gas attacks since 1983; Iraq's denials 
were proven false by a United Nations investigation in 1984, but the use of chemical 
weapons continued. See Urquhart, The United Nations and the Iraq-Iran War, I988 
SIPRI Y.B., supra note 20, at 507, 509-10. 
136. At the 1989 Paris conference on chemical weapons, the 140 nations repre-
sented agreed to condemn the use of chemical weapons, and to call for swift completion 
of a new treaty to ban them altogether, but the conference was unable to achieve con-
sensus regarding any program of sanctions against the states that had employed chemi-
cals in warfare, and most panicipants did not even mention Iraq and Iran by name in 
discussing chemical weapons use. See Bunn, Paris Conference Condemns Chemical 
· Weapons Use, Arms Control Today, Jan./Feb. 1989, at 27, 27. 
137. See V. Utgoff, supra note 65, at 2-8 (analyzing range of values that might 
prompt states to procure chemical weapons). . 
To simplify the presentation in this Article, we have adopted the conventional 
model of analyzing a government's behavior as if it were a unitary, rational actor. A 
more complex structure would probe the internal operations of this national entity, in-
quiring into the bureaucratic operating procedures, the personal stakes of key individu-
als, and other considerations, attempting to identify the diverse organizational and 
human pressures that affect national behavior. See G. Allison, Essence of Decision: Ex-
plaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (I971). 
138. It is noteworthy, for example, that all the nonnuclear weapons states that are 
allied by treaty with the United States or the Soviet Union have either signed the NPT or 
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thus induce many states to join new multilateral disarmament agree-
ments even without additional incentives. 
At the other end of the spectrum, for any particular agreement, 
there will probably be a group of countries whose leaders believe that 
adherence ~ould not aid, and might significantly impair, national secur-
ity. No legitimate inducement will prompt these countries to partici-
pate in the treaty regime; they are motivated principally by internal 
political factors or by perceptions of advantage and risk in their imme-
diate geographical region.I39 
Between these two extremes there will be many nations whose par-
ticipation in a particular arms control regime will be determined by a 
complex, ad hoc balancing of national interests and costs. For these 
states, joining the treaty would not seriously threaten national security; 
they may not even have tried to obtain the weapon system that is now 
being regulated. But other things being equal, their leaders might pre-
fer to keep their options open, the world being an uncertain and rapidly 
changing place, and the regional environment perhaps a dangerous 
one. 
For the substantial group of countries in the latter category, the 
significant economic incentives that we propose could strongly rein-
force the pressure of world public opinion. Cash and other valuable 
benefits on the barrelhead may prove to be especially attractive, making 
the value of joining the treaty concrete and immediate. As opposed to 
the more intangible considerations of "prestige" and retention of spec-
ulative future options, the immediate availability of significant develop-
ment funds may make the difference between a country's adhering or 
not adhering to the next generation of multilateral arms control 
agreements.140 
IV. THE LINK BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 
The obvious bargain, then, is disarmament for development. 141 
otherwise accepted its safeguards on all their nuclear facilities. The major sponsors of a 
disarmament agreement have been able to exert substantial leverage upon their clients 
to adhere to the pact. 
139. Even for these countries, the type of treaty regime we propose could make a 
difference in the long run. It would strengthen the hand of moderate factions, who 
could argue more persuasively in internal political councils in favor of joining the inter· 
national consensus. If a moderate leader did emerge, he or she could sign a treaty, 
setting a course that would be difficult to reverse, even for any radical successors. Sub-
sequent governments would have to abrogate or violate the agreement, losing economic 
benefits and risking sanctions, in order to add the controlled weapons to an arsenal. 
140. Cf. Jones & Muller, supra note 15, at 22 (advocating attempts to influence 
incentive structures of states most prone to proliferate by manipulating factors shaping 
their internal demands for new weaponry). 
141. See Final Document, supra note 70, preamble & 11 2, at 372-73 ("Disarma-
ment and development are two pillars on which enduring international peace and secur-
ity can be built"); [1987] 12 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 351, U.N.Sales No. E.88.IX.2 
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But because this sort of tradeoff can succeed only if certain basic strate-
gies are incorporated, this Part outlines seven principles that ought to 
guide treaty negotiators and implementors. 
A. Make the Development Funds Reliable 
For developing states to be enticed to accept this type of bargain, 
they will have to be confident that the pledges of economic assistance 
will not evaporate as soon as the ink is dry on the commitments to 
forego arms racing. To this end, the donor states should take steps to 
ensure that the promised assistance will be delivered reliably, in-
dependent of financial vicissitudes or political tempests. 
' For this reason, to the extent that the assistance to be provided 
under a treaty consists of cash or fungible commodities, at least a few 
years' worth of assistance should be set aside in a dedicated interna-
tional trust fund at the outset of the treaty, and periodically renewed as 
annual drawdowns occur.142 Disbursements should be made annually, 
and by an impartial international agency. 
It is important to specify that the aid will be provided annually, 
rather than on a one-shot basis, so recipient states will learn to take it 
into account in their internal budgeting cycles every year, will come to 
depend upon it, and will notice very quickly the deleterious effects of its 
withdrawal or diminution.I43 
Similarly, it is surely preferable to funnel support of any kind-
whether cash or technical assistance-through an international agency, 
established by the treaty and including membership by recipient states, 
rather than relying upon bilateral programs developed and conducted 
(1987) ("Sweden declared that if the gap between ... rich countries did not diminish, 
everybody's security ... would be threatened"); see also Deger, supra note 67, at 517 (if 
militarily advanced states are unwilling to agree to arms control because they fear that 
reductions might jeopardize their security, developing states are likely to follow their 
footsteps toward increasing weapons deployments, jeopardizing any hope of economic 
development). 
142. In a comparable fashion, the Algiers accords, which resolved the United 
States/Iran hostage crisis in 1981, established a Claims Tribunal at the Hague through 
which a series of escrow accounts was established to compensate various categories of 
individuals, companies, banks, and governmental claimants. The agreement calls for 
Iran to replenish the security accounts whenever they fall below pre-established levels to 
ensure that the awards can be paid without delay. To date, the tribunal has awarded 
approximately $1.278 billion to American nationals, and many more large claims are 
outstanding. See Update on U.S.-Iran Claims Settlement, State Dep't Fact Sheet, Aug. 
9, 1989, reprinted in 89 Dep't St. Bull. No. 2152, Nov. 1989, at 60; see also International 
Disarmament Fund, supra note 71, at 30 (describing procedures for initial endowment 
of international development fund, with continuous subsequent additions). 
143. Cf. Beilenson, supra note 68, at 842-43 (surveying historical illustrations of 
foreign aid, including several in which lump-sum payments in advance failed to achieve 
their goals because recipients reneged on bargain after securing funds, as well as a few 
cases of installment-plan aid, which succeeded because recipients desired to continue 
flow of assistance). 
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directly by donor nations. 144 Disbursements should be made by the 
prearranged trustees, thereby placing the funds beyond the control of 
the donor states. The insulation provided by an agreed multilateral in-
stitution, which should grow over the years in credibility and respect, 
will also help to blunt some of the charges of economic imperialism or 
unwarranted intervention in domestic affairs that will inevitably 
arise.145 Individual bilateral aid programs can continue to exist, of 
course, but states may come to appreciate that by banding together 
they can accomplish more, and do so at less individual cost, than they 
could separately .146. 
B. Make the Linkage Explicit and Overt 
Much of the aura of impropriety that might otherwise surround 
this proposal would be dispelled simply by being open and above-
board about the terms of the deal. Our program would have nothing to 
hide, and there would be no occasion for under-the-table personal self-
enrichment for any officials. A detailed, published code of conduct that 
specifies what types of national behavior will earn specified degrees of 
international financial support is likely to be more influential, reliable, 
and respectable than the secret protocols or oral understandings asso-
ciated with some past efforts at arms control.147 
144. See International Disarmament Fund, supra note 71, at 27-29; Sollie, supra 
note 76, at 78. 
145. Insisting upon a multilateral structure for the aid program also will help en-
sure that the sanctions portion of the regime is rigorously enforced: in a strictly bilateral 
relationship, the donor state might be too willing to "forgive" unfavorable behavior, or 
might be tempted to elevate other foreign policy goals over nonproliferation. In con-
trast, the international regime might be more single-minded in insisting upon high stan-
dards of behavior regarding compliance with international norms. Cf. L. Spector, supra 
note 29, at 125-30 (Even though Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapons worried United 
States, generous aid programs continued in order to sustain Pakistan's participation in 
American efforts to assist Afghan rebels fighting Soviet forces.). 
146. Cf. Pipart & Sada, supra note 76, at 111-18 (advocating regional approach to 
disarmament and development). But see P.T. Bauer, supra note 72, at 63-64 (multilat-
eral aid programs are worse than bilateral subsidies, aggravating economic 
inefficiencies). 
147. Those understandings, of course, rarely remain covert, and their disclosure 
may create further obstacles. During the SALT I negotiations, for example, there were 
complaints from the United States Senate that Henry Kissinger's reliance upon private 
"backchannel" negotiations had resulted in "secret deals" with the Soviet Union that 
had been withheld from other segments of the American executive branch, as well as 
from the Congress. The process resulted in considerable political turmoil inside the 
United States, complicating the international negotiations, too. See T. Wolfe, The 
SALT Experience 88-89 (1979); see also R. Sivard, World Military and Social Expendi-
tures 1987-88, at 11 (1987) (reporting exposure of several hitherto-secret international 
weapons-related agreements). The Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a) (1988), re-
quires the President promptly to transmit to the Congress, or to designated committees 
thereof, the full text of every international agreement to which the United States be-
comes a party, even those that the executive believes ought to be kept secret from the 
general public. 
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C. Make the Tradeoff Proportional 
A new multilateral disarmament treaty should specify in detail what 
measures of development assistance, and what dollar volumes of sup-
port, are available for states that fulfill its requirements. Just as clearly, 
the treaty should spell out the debit side of the bargain: what kinds of 
misdeeds will result in the phased withdrawal of certain types and de-
grees of financial and other aid. The advantage of dealing with money, 
or with other economic incentives that can be measured in dollar terms, 
is that money is infinitely divisible, so the proffered financial incentives 
to join and comply with a future treaty arrangement can be related on a 
case-by-case basis to the particular circumstances. 
The international body that implements the treaty should have the 
power to determine, prior to allocating each annual funding, whether a 
particular recipient state was in full compliance with all its treaty obliga-
tions and therefore authorized to receive its complete share of the 
funds. A party that had committed a minor or technical violation might 
be deemed, for that year, to be entided to receive only ninety percent 
or ninety-five percent of its intended allocation. More egregious mis-
behavior would trigger greater reductions, pursuant to a calibrated, 
previously determined schedule of charges, or as developed over the 
years by an evolving case law of acljudications. The treaty would con-
tain no obstacle, of course, to any recipient country's passing internal 
legislation that would give it a right to recover any lost share from a 
person or entity that had caused that state to violate its treaty obliga-
tions and consequendy suffer a shortfall (e.g., a chemical manufactur-
ing company that failed to file required production reports). 
It will be important to develop a detailed code of conduct because 
there will be violations of future disarmament accords. As noted, the 
next generation of arms control treaties necessarily will become very 
technical and precise. This welter of specificity will be essential for the 
proper regulation of weaponry, but it also will occasion a high volume 
of reported inconsistencies and alarms.148 For example, declared 
stockpiles of chemicals or other substances will be discovered to be 
somewhat inaccurate, perhaps through unavoidable human error. De-
struction schedules for excess arms will not always be scrupulously 
148. 1n the context of strategic nuclear anns, the Standing Consultative Commis-
sion (SCC), created pursuant to the ABM Treaty, supra note 4, art. Xlll, 23 U.S.T. at 
3444, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 10, has provided the vehicle for the United States and the 
Soviet Union to address and resolve confidentially many of the ambiguitjes and technical 
uncertainties that inevitably arise during the life of a complex and detailed arms control 
agreement. During much of its life, the SCC has been a busy and productive forum, with 
a great many small-but-important issues being raised by both sides. See Graybeal & 
Krepon, SCC: Neglected Arms Control Tool, Bull. Atom. Scientists, Nov. 1985, at 30, 
30- 31; Smith, Arms Agreement Breathes New Life into SCC, 229 Science 535, 535-37 
(1985). 
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met.149 Officials or nongovernmental personnel may, through no fault 
or bad will of the government, impede a required inspection.150 In 
areas in which the agreement is ambiguous, some states will deliber-
ately engage in acts that are arguably innocent but that may eventually 
be judged to be violations. I 51 
In addition, there may be more serious violations, such as refusal 
to comply fully with a mandatory "confidence-building measure,"152 in-
complete cooperation with an on-site inspection, or nonparticipation in 
149. Even the INF agreement, supra note 93, which has benefited from the most 
painstaking verification apparatus yet implemented, has suffered from occasional con-
troversies regarding the schedules for dismantling excess weapons, the unanticipated 
deployment of SS-23s in Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union's refusal to permit 
American observers at the Votkinsk missile plant to use X-ray machines to scan truck 
cargoes. See Lorenz, Controversies Mar Soviet INF Compliance, Arms Control Today, 
Apr. 1990, at 29, 29; Flournoy, Soviets Charge U.S. Missile Conversions May Violate 
INF Treaty, Arms Control Today, Mar. 1989, at 26, 26. 
150. In on-site inspections conducted pursuant to the Stockholm Document, see 
infra note 152, Soviet officials were initially aggressive, but later seemed to mellow to-
ward the process; throughout they approached it with the attitude of reaching practical 
compromise solutions to the ambiguities and gaps in the agreement. See Stovall, The 
Stockholm Accord: On-Site Inspections in Eastern and Western Europe, in Arms Con-
trol Verification & The New Role of On-Site Inspection 15, 28-30 (L, Dunn & A. Gordon 
eds. 1990). 
151. Sometimes, even in matters of intense national security, accidents happen and 
unintended violations occur. In the early years of the LTBT, supra note 20, for exam-
ple, the superpowers, with all their technological sophistication, occasionally vented ra-
dioactive debris from underground explosions, and sometimes the waste products 
escaped beyond national boundaries in violation of the agreement. See Pincus, U.S. 
Secretly Protested Radiation Leaks From Soviet Arms Tests, Perle Says, Wash. Post, 
May 9, 1986, at A23, col. 1. 
Similarly, regarding the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (Treaty on the Limitation of 
Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests), July 3, 1974, United States-U.S.S.R., art. I, 13 
I.L.M. 906, 907 (signed but not ratified), which imposed a 150 kiloton ceiling on the 
yield of underground nuclear tests, the parties were aware that technical difficulties 
might mean that some explosions that were designed to produce yields very close to the 
maximum allowed size might accidentally exceed that level. They therefore agreed that 
one or two slight unintended breaches per year of the yield ceiling would not be consid-
ered a violation of the treaty, but would be a cause for concern and consultations. See 
Texts and Histories of Negotiations, supra note 19, at 185-86. 
152. A "confidence-building measure" or "confidence- and security-building mea-
sure" (CBM or CSBM) is an agreement that does not actually reduce the two sides' 
arsenals of military equipment or personnel, but that enhances stability in other ways by 
making each side less worried that ambignous weapons-related activities occurring in-
side the other state might be a practice or preparation for an aggressive surprise attack. 
Examples of such measures include advance notification oflarge out-of-garrison maneu-
vers, permission for foreigners to conduct aerial surveys, exchanges of diplomatic brief-
ings, and invitation of foreign observers to monitor troop movements. Several such 
measures were agreed upon in the Stockholm Document in 1986 and additional refine-
ments are now under negotiation in the CDE talks in Vienna. See Document of the 
Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarma-
ment in Europe Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Conclud-
ing Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation 
in Europe, Sept. 19, 1986, reprinted in 1987 SIPRI Y.B., supra note 8, at 355, 355-69; 
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an established dispute-resolution mechanism, that would warrant a 
more significant withholding of funding or the imposition of other 
sanctions, but still not justify the abrogation of the treaty. Even more 
egregious violations, such as deliberately tardy compliance with a 
schedule for dismantling of weapons or facilities, could also be dealt 
with in part by a previously announced menu of financial penalties. 
Moreover, in the cases of even the most outrageous conduct, such as 
illegal use of banned weapons in combat, the option of imposing mean-
ingful immediate financial costs could provide an additional policy tool 
that offended states could bring to bear to help punish the violator, 
offset the advantages of cheating, and deter other potential 
miscreants.153 
Like a system of civil or criminal fines, these treaty sanctions can be 
directly proportional to the seriousness or deliberateness of the viola-
tion, and they can deal more harshly with recidivists. These sanctions 
would, however, be less threatening than fines and less offensive to the 
country against which they are imposed: a fine can only be seen as pu-
nitive, in taking away something that is owned or possessed by the tar-
get, while our proposal simply declines to release to the target a 
quantity of funds to which it has a not-yet-vested claim. More impor-
tantly, unlike a system of fines-which, in the absence of an effective 
international police force, any charged state might simply refuse to 
pay-this sanction system would remain fully within the control of the 
international apparatus. If a violation is found, the annual monetary 
payments would be reduced or eliminated, and the erstwhile recipient 
could not unilaterally escape the treaty's reach. 
D. Make the Aid Specific and Useful for Economic Development 
The subsidy program should be designed to identify and target 
specific opportunities for enhancing economic development in each re-
cipient state. The program should not rely exclusively upon cash trans-
fers, I 54 but should emphasize a package approach, including capital, 
technology, management services, and marketing advice.155 Abdus 
Salam suggests that education grants and research support could also 
Borawski, supra note 51, at 11-15; News and Negotiations, The Other European Negoti-
ations: CDE Resumes Confidence-Building, Arms Control Today, Apr. 1989, at 24. 
153. The negotiators will also have to develop suitable ~echanisms for dealing with 
treaty violations committed by the donor states. Because withdrawal of financial privi-
leges would not be applicable, other sanctions will have to be devised. 
154. See]. Baker, supra note 73, at 1 ("Few of these countries [the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe] are interested in outright grants or aid. Instead, most are seeking 
what we call technical economic cooperation .... "). 
155. Cf. Sewell & Contee, supra note 74, at 1023-24 (many middle-income devel-
oping states, such as Mexico, Taiwan, Venezuela, Brazil, and Nigeria, no longer need 
traditional concessional foreign aid, but will require nonconcessional financing to sur-
mount debt problems and to support productive investment);]. Baker, supra note 73, at 
6 (United States experts are providing advice to the Soviet Union regarding small busi-
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be useful attractions. 156 Similarly, tariff concessions or guarantees to 
purchase (or to supply) particular goods at stable prices throughout the 
duration of the treaty could help. 157 In-kind transfers of surplus equip-
ment and materials could also play a valuable role in assisting local de-
velopment efforts. Iss 
Not all economic development is sound or sustainable, as P.T. 
Bauer has made clear; 159 the international authority will have to search 
to identify productive opportunities and to minimize waste.160 Atten-
tion will have to be paid to both long-term and short-term opportuni-
ties and dislocations, and an individualized program of development 
will have to be crafted for each state. Each program will have to be 
monitored and reviewed critically to ensure effective performance and 
to avoid diversion or waste.I61 
Ideally, the development funds will be used to start new projects, 
to sustain experiments during crucial initial years, to create a modem 
infrastructure, and to open new sectors for ordinary indigenous com-
mercial exploitation. In most instances, merely subsidizing the operat-
ing expenses of existing facilities and services would be less 
worthwhile. When recipient countries' governments so desire, the pro-
grams could be targeted to reach the poor directly, 162 but even in these 
cases an emphasis should be given to training, investment, and oppor-
tunities for sustainable growth, rather than only to immediate relief. 163 
ness operations, financial markets and stock exchange operations, efficient tax collec-
tion, and economic statistics). 
156. See Salam, supra note 73, at 8-10; see alsoP. Harrison, supra note 70, at 88 
(small investment in spreading agricultural technology could dramatically increase farm 
productivity). 
157. See P.T. Bauer, supra note 72, at 62; L. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 60-64; A 
Programme for Survival, supra note 2, at 71, 145-46; Sewell & Contee, supra note 74, at 
1029. 
158. Cf. International Disarmament Fund, supra note 71, at 24 (surpluses of equip-
ment were widely distributed, to good effect, immediately after World War II). 
159. See P.T. Bauer, supra note 72, at 46 (arguing that foreign aid tends to bias 
recipient toward adoption ofWestern models of economic development, which may not 
be suitable in local context). 
160. American aid programs during the 1950s and 1960s were often criticized for 
poor planning. An aide to Senator Patrick J. Leahy, chair of the Appropriations Sub-
committee on Foreign Operations, recalls, "We built a lot of roads that went from no-
where to nowhere and power plant projects that turned out to cause huge 
environmental problems." Stanfield, supra note 75, at 1225; see also Fontanel, The 
International Disarmament Fund for Development, Disarmament, Spring 1986, at 19, 
22 (discussing need to ensure that development assistance truly benefits recipients, not 
simply tying them economically to donor by creating captive markets for useless 
products). 
161. See Pipart & Sada, supra note 76, at 154. 
162. See P.T. Bauer, supra note 72, at 49-50 (arguing that most aid programs serve 
to benefit the entrenched leadership in recipient states, rather than to improve the lives 
of the poor they were designed for). 
163. See A Programme for Survival, supra note 2, at 94 (investment in irrigation 
systems, roads, rural electrification, fertilizers, and pesticides is better than food relief). 
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A comparison with the NPT is illustrative here, for that treaty is the 
closest current analogue to what we propose, and the practical short-
comings of that set of exchange arrangements can guide future negotia-
tors. Under the NPT -in addition to the basic ban on the further 
spread of nuclear weapons164-the parties undertook to share the then-
dazzling promise of civilian nuclear power.165 In particular, the nuclear 
"have" states promised in article IV of the Treaty to "cooperate in con-
164. In return for the promise, made by the states that did not then possess nuclear 
weapons, never to manufacture or otherwise acquire them, the NPT tradeoff elicited two 
basic commitments from the states that had already joined the "nuclear club." First, 
they agreed, in article VI, "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarma-
ment, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control." NPT, supra note 21, art. VI, 21 U.S.T. at 490, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 
at 8, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173. Second, they promised, in articles IV and V, to extend to 
other countries the non-military benefits of nuclear energy. ld., arts. IV, V, 21 U.S.T at 
489-90, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, at 7-8, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172-73. 
The failure of the major powers to conclude arms control agreements that satisfy 
the strict criteria of article VI has been a point of substantial contention at the various 
review conferences that have been convened to assess the operation of the NPT. Unless 
the superpowers register much better performance in this regard in the future- particu-
larly on progress toward a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty that would halt test 
explosions of nuclear weapons-even greater controversy is expected in the future. 
Again, the nonnuclear weapons states argue that under the NPT they have traded away a 
specific right (the option to develop their own nuclear arms) in return for only a vague, 
easily avoided promise to negotiate superpower arms control in the future. See D. 
Fischer, supra note 65, at 24-26; News and Comments, Sparring on Test Ban Likely at 
NPT Review, 229 Science 630 (1985); Goldblat, supra note 21, at 378-79. 
165. The commitment to spread the benefits of civilian nuclear energy had two 
distinguishable components, both of which have suffered from adverse economics and 
simple neglect. Under article IV, the nuclear "have" states were supposed to share the 
anticipated growth of nuclear power generation, extending to the "have not" states the 
technology and materials necessary for civilian plants to replace fossil fuel and other 
facilities. See NPT, supra note 21, art. IV, 21 U.S.T. at 489-90, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, at 
7-8, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172-73. Under article V, the nuclear weapons states also promised 
to make available, on a nondiscriminatory basis and at as low a charge as possible, the 
potential benefits of"peaceful nuclear explosions" (PNEs). Id., art. V, 21 U.S.T. at 490, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6839, at 8, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173. At the time the NPT was sigued, many 
people contemplated that nuclear explosions could be useful for diverse civil engineer-
ing projects, such as digging a canal, rerouting a river, clearing a navigation channel, or 
constructing an underground storage cavity. ln fact, however, the dangers of PNEs 
came to overwhelm the advantages: the environmental harm was substantial, the eco-
nomic costs turned out to be larger than anticipated, and the parties were unable to 
develop procedures for conducting PNEs that did not also enable the participants to 
obtain technological information that could contribute to the development of nuclear 
weapons. Accordingly, the United States' interest in conducting PNEs-or in making 
PNE services available to other states-quickly began to wane, and although the Soviet 
program lingered for a few more years, it, too, never achieved the prominence originally 
forecast. Again, the nonnuclear weapons states were left with little to show under article 
V for their adherence to the NPT; the nuclear weapons states avoided the promised 
sharing of technology and PNE benefits. See D. Fischer, supra note 65, at 23-24; 
Findlay, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions and the NPT: Letting a Dead Letter Lie, 10 Arms 
Control 219, passim (1989). 
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tributing ... to the further development of the applications of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nu-
clear weapon States Parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for 
the needs of the developing areas of the world."l66 
This language was widely understood at the time to be a part of an 
essential tradeoff, ensuring the nonnuclear states that, if they agreed to 
abandon any nuclear weapons aspirations, they would still share the 
anticipated bounty of emerging technology related to civilian nuclear 
power production.167 Within a few years after the treaty was negoti-
ated, however, several Western states, particularly the United States, 
lost their ardor for nuclear power plants and became less interested in 
developing and promoting that form of energy.168 International nu-
clear commerce became less frequent, and the anticipated level of shar-
ing the benefits of nuclear power has never been attained. 169 Third 
166. NPT, supra note 21, art. IV.2, 21 U.S.T. at 489-90, T.l.A.S. No. 6839, at 7-8, 
729 U.N.T.S. at 172-73. 
167. See Maynes, UN Disarmament Efforts: Is There Life After the Second UN 
Special Session on Disarmament?, in Arms Control: The Multilateral Alternative, supra 
note 18, at 52, 57 (tradeoff was "basic bargain" that persuaded many nonnuclear weap-
ons states to accept discriminatory standards of NPT). 
168. When the NPT entered into force in 1970, orders for the construction of new 
nuclear power plants were pouring in, especially from the United States, but by 1975, 
the demand had crested, and by 1985, the nuclear power industry was in recession 
worldwide. Most recent estimates of the amount of power that will be generated in 
nuclear plants in the year 2000 are less than 20% of the estimates of a decade ago. See 
D. Fischer, supra note 65, at 22. 
169. In one important area, the NPT deals with the issue of costs in an entirely 
counterproductive fashion. That is, the treaty regime sensibly requires the imposition of 
"full scope safeguards" on the nuclear power activities of the nonnuclear weapons 
states, but does not mandate similar inspections and controls on the comparable activi-
ties of the nations which were already acknowledged to possess nuclear weapons. The 
rationale for this distinction was that the controls were desigued to deter covert diver-
sion of nuclear materials from civilian to military applications, and that no such diver-
sion would be logical in states that were permitted by the treaty to maintain 
independent, unsafeguarded nuclear military facilities. 
Some states were initially concerned that the inspection scheme would inflict exces-
sive costs on the developing states, placing them at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis 
the nuclear weapon states, who could avoid those expenses and burdens in their own 
generation of civil nuclear power. In response, each of the nuclear weapons states has 
made a "voluntary offer," allowing the application of comparable international safe-
guards on some or all of its civilian nuclear facilities (while still retaining the privacy of 
its military programs). The concept was that these voluntary programs would help 
demonstrate to all states that the safeguards programs were not too costly or unfair. See 
[1988] 13 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 260, U.N. Sales No. E.89.IX.5 (1988); Texts and His-
tories of the Negotiations, supra note 19, at 223-60; D. Fischer, supra note 65, at 18. 
A more sensible system, however, comparable to the one we propose in this Article, 
would call upon the nuclear weapons states to compensate the nonnuclear weapons states 
for the price of the inspection system. Instead of compounding the costs of verification 
by making every state bear an equal burden, even when there is no arms control rationale 
for imposing the safeguards on a particular country, it would be more efficient to require 
safeguards only where they are necessary to ensure compliance with the treaty, and to 
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world expectations that they had traded their right to build nuclear 
weapons in exchange for atomic development assistance have therefore 
been profoundly disappointed.170 Oswaldo De Rivero, the president of 
the 1990 NPT review conference, accordingly highlighted the need to 
redress this imbalance by elaborating the existing treaty regime in a 
way that provides additional economic incentives, tied to the needs of 
individual developing states, to make the treaty more attractive to 
nonparties.171 
The problem with article IV of the NPT from the perspective of 
developing countries is not that it embodied a trade-off, but that the 
treaty was written in the most general terms, with no concrete commit-
ments from the developed world. The negotiators were too timid, fail-
ing to reach the degree of specificity that could have converted 
hortatory language into a legally enforceable instrument. We suspect 
that the history of article IV would have been quite different if, for ex-
ample, the developed countries had explicitly undertaken to build, 
within the first ten years of the treaty regime, at least one nuclear power 
plant in each developing country that adhered to the agreement.172 
treat the costs of those safeguards as a part of the price of the overall treaty regime, to 
be borne or redistributed in some other fashion. If the wealthy states would pay for all 
safeguards everywhere, they would thereby help encourage developing countries to join 
the treaty, and would not create additional, unnecessary costs for their own nuclear 
power activities. 
170. The International Atomic Energy Agency has projected that by the end of the 
century, nuclear power will account for 30% of the electricity generated in the devel-
oped countries, but only 7% of the electricity generated in the developing states, with 
half or more of the developing countries' total being confined to just two states, Taiwan 
and Korea. See D. Fischer, supra note 65, at 11. 
The developed states' failure to make nuclear power more widely and cheaply avail-
able is likely to be a substantial issue at future NPT review conferences, including the 
1995 conference that will decide whether to extend the treaty beyond its initial 25-year 
term. See Dunn, supra note 54, at 100-01; Mayorsky, supra note 54, at 89. 
171. See De Rivero, NonProliferation: A Key Element of a Planetary Culture and 
Common Security for the Twenty First Century, Keynote Address to the Conference on 
Non-Proliferation, Guernsey, May 11-14, 1990, at 8-9 (on file wirh Columbia Law Re-
view). The president also noted that many developing countries "obtain nothing from 
the treaty" and continue to adhere to it mainly out of a sense of legal inertia. I d. 
172. Making this type of explicit trade would not preclude the parties from chang-
ing their minds and agreeing to alter the bargain if subsequent economic or environ-
mental concerns made the initial promise of a nuclear power facility less attractive than 
originally contemplated. When changed conditions emerge, the parties could renegoti-
ate the treaty, substituting some other form of compensation for the facility that one or 
both sides had come to consider undesirable. But the explicit contractual tradeoff (and 
the requirement that developing states consent before the treaty is modified) would 
avoid putting the nonnuclear weapons states in the unenviable position in which they 
currently find themselves under the NPT, having foresworn an important weapons capa-
bility and receiving nothing tangible in return. 
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E. Tie the Substance of the Development Programs to the Substance of the 
Disannament Programs 
Whenever possible, there should be a clear technical and economic 
relationship between the type of assistance being provided and the mili-
tary options being foresworn. This form of linkage can make the bar-
gain more politically palatable for donors and recipients alike, 
emphasizing the equality of the parties that will be essential for future 
disarmament agreements. 
For example, it may be easier for many countries to accept fundti 
earmarked as "construction grants" for the creation of a new chemical 
or fertilizer factory in exchange for commitments not to produce chem-
ical weapons. 173 Indeed, in March 1990, Moammar Gadhafi actually 
suggested that Libya would abandon its suspected chemical weapons 
facility at Rabta in exchange for Western construction of a modern 
pharmaceutical factory. 174 The alternative, offering unrestricted cash 
for the same type of obligation, gives the recipient greater freedom re-
garding the ultimate use of the funds, but may be more offensive or 
politically unsound for both sides. 
Not every disarmament provision will lend itself to this type of 
linkage, but with creativity and commercial incentives, a suitable associ-
ation could usually be found: trading satellite technology for restric-
. tions on antisatellite weaponry; trading fisheries supports for 
limitations on attack submarines; and so on. 175 
It similarly may be useful to characterize at least some of the eco-
nomic subsidies as "retooling assistance," to help cover the anticipated 
costs of converting plants and equipment from weapons production to 
civilian applications and of retraining the labor pool. 176 Another por-
tion of the aid could be denominated as "reimbursement" for the bur-
I73. Whenever the facilities provided under the agreement could be adapted to 
military uses (e.g., a chemical factory that could be converted to manufacture nerve gas) 
the facilities should be subject to monitoring and inspections by the international agency 
established under the agreement. 
I74. This arrangement was said to provide a solution to the international concern 
about Rabta and still allow Libya to save face. See Parmelee, Libya Said to Offer to 
Dismantle Plant If It Is Given New One, Wash. Post, May 3, I990, at A33, col. 2. 
I75. In some circumstances, it might be useful to link development and disarma-
ment across more than one treaty simultaneously. That is, state X might be reluctant to 
adhere to a new treaty limiting its arsenal of chemical weapons as long as it fears that its 
neighboring state Y is retaining a stockpile of nuclear arms. At the same time, Y may 
have no interest in developing chemical weapons itself, but would not dismantle its nu-
clear forces as long as X retains chemical weapons capabilities. A single package that 
addresses all these concerns at once--and that throws in important assistance to pro-
mote economic growth in both states-may be the only procedure for breaking the 
impasse. 
I76. See Dumas, Economic Conversion: Preparing for Peate, Disarmament, Issue 
2, I990, at I97, 205-07; Adams, Economic Conversion Misses' the Point, Bull. Atom. 
Scientists, Feb. I986, at 24, 24; see also IA I. Thorsson, In Pursuit of Disarmament: 
Conversion from Military to Civil Production in Sweden 27I-98 (I984) (studying in de-
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dens imposed by the verification inspections and for the risks, however 
small, that some of the inspectors might engage in untoward industrial 
espionage. Education grants or research support might serve a similar 
function.177 
F. Include an Obligation to Participate in Treaty Verification and Enforcement 
Systems 
To avoid some of the worst shortcomings of existing arms control 
agreements, future treaties should specify that each recipient's share of 
the annual development funds will also depend upon its punctilious ob-
servation of the implementation process.178 That is, each state must 
not only comply with the substantive disarmament provisions, it must 
also compile a clean record of respect for, and cooperation with, the 
associated verification and enforcement systems.179 
Thus, a state could lose a portion of its share of benefits by failing 
to submit all the required disclosures about weapons production and 
destruction, by impeding the functions of automated monitoring equip-
ment, by frustrating the activities of on-site inspectors, by failing to par-
ticipate in whatever dispute-resolution procedure the treaty establishes, 
or by thwarting international efforts to effectuate a series of sanctions 
against treaty violators. 
Each future disarmament treaty should specify an international 
mechanism for clarifying ambiguities regarding compliance, ancl should 
identify an authoritative institution for registering final acljudica-
tions.180 There need not be a separate fact-finding and acljudicating 
tail the possibility of converting national economy to lower levels of military spending 
pursuant to future arms control agreements). 
177. In some states, the military serves both as an employer oflast resort and as a 
forum for providing basic training in literacy, health care, technical skills, and organiza-
tion. See L. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 104. If the aid program we envisage could pro-
vide suitable alternative mechanisms for fulfilling these important social functions, it 
might be easier for a developing country to reduce the size of its army. See Palme Com-
mission Report, supra note 47, at 91-93 (in most developing states, military spending 
typically does little to promote employment for those who need it most). 
178. Both the BWC and the Environmental Modification Convention contain obli-
gations upon the parties "to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Se-
curity Council may initiate" in response to allegations of noncompliance. BWC, supra 
note 22, art. VI.2, 26 U.S.T. at 588, T.I.A.S. No. 8062, at 6, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 167; 
Environmental Modification Convention, supra note 23, art. V.4, 31 U.S.T. at 338, 
T.I.A.S. No. 9614, at 6, 1108 U.N.T.S. at 154. 
179. Cf. Lowenthal & Wit, The Politics of Verification, in Verification and Arms 
Control, supra note 98, at 153, 162-65 (treaty verification has become intensely political 
issue, with uncertainties in monitoring process and lack of consensus about appropriate 
standards undercutting progress toward arms control). 
180. The International Court of justice is one possible forum for this dispute reso-
lution, and there have been suggestions that several countries are interested in the pos-
sibility of making the court a more important center of international judicial activity. 
See Cody, Soviet, U.S. Proposals Animate World Court, Wash. Post, Nov. 24, 1988, at 
F1, col. 5. In addition, the United Nations Secretary General has recently created a trust 
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organization for each disarmament treaty; several could efficiently be 
folded into the same umbrella organization.18 1 But whether there is 
one such institution or many, each treaty must insist that good faith, 
comprehensive implementation of its decisions is required for full re-
ceipt of the promised economic aid. 
G. Design an Equitable, Acceptable Mechanism for Collecting and Distributing 
the Financial Aid 
Developing the practical mechanics for a system of positive eco-
nomic incentives is more difficult than constructing the theoretical case 
in its favor. Important and sensitive problems abound regarding the 
overall size of the monetary transfers, the division of responsibilities 
among the paying states, and the relative shares to be made available to 
potentially eligible countries. 
These questions have no "right answers," but a few useful guide-
lines may be discerned. First, the total amount of funds available for all 
the disarmament treaties should bear some logical relationship to the 
quantity of resources to be freed up as a "peace dividend" generated by 
the ending of the Cold War. 182 Many leading experts now estimate that 
the United States could prudently reduce its defense budget by at least 
$150 billion per year (compared with what annual defense expendi-
tures would have been if the Cold War had continued) and still meet its 
military commitments and protect its interests in the planet's recon-
figured political environment. 183 If we double that figure to represent 
fund "to make available financial assistance to States where necessary so as to enable 
them to use the Court for the settlement of their legal differences." United Nations: 
Secretary-General's Trust Fund to Assist States in the Settlement of Disputes Through 
the International Court of justice, 28 I.L.M. 1589, 1589 (1989). 
181. Cf. Trimble, supra note 123, at 905 (proposing single Institute to perform 
fact-finding and dispute-resolution functions for all modern arms control agreements). 
182. Political considerations make it highly unlikely that a substantial program of 
development assistance could be reliably funded through tax increases, deficit spending, 
or reduced domestic consumption. As a result, reduced defense spending via multilat-
eral arms control offers the surest method for freeing up necessary monies. See Klein, 
Disarmament and Socio-Economic Development, Disarmament, Spring 1986, at 49, 56; 
see also Disarmament and Development, supra note 73, at 140, 147-49 (assessing pros-
pects for tying development assistance to "disarmament dividend"). 
183. See $150 Billion a Year: Where to Find It, N.Y. Time'S, Mar. 8, 1990, at A24, 
col. 1 (editorial pt. 1); $150 Billion a Year: How to Spend lt, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1990, 
at A34, col. 1 (editorial pt. 2); cf. Defense Budget Task Force of the Committee for 
National Security and the Defense Budget Project, Restructuring the US Military: De-
fense Needs in the 21st Century 7-10 (1990) (projecting possible cuts of approximately 
$150 billion per year by 2000) (on file with Columbia law Review). 
Although the massive United States response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has led 
some analysts to question whether there will in fact be a significant cut in American 
armed forces and a resulting "peace dividend," several months into the Desert Shield 
operation, the Navy's top program planner spoke of the Gulf buildup as ·~ust a pertur-
bation in the flow of events" that would not fundamentally alter future downward budg-
etary trends; other military and political leaders were also planning to continue to 
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the savings for the entire developed world, and assume that domestic 
needs will have priority claims on ninety percent of the total savings in 
each country,l84 then approximately $30 billion per year should be 
available for transfer to other countries to meet new international se-
curity needs. If half a dozen important new multilateral disarmament 
treaties must be negotiated, or existing treaties enhanced, over the next 
two decades, then the incentive structure for each could involve trans-
fers on the order of $5 billion per year. A substantia.! portion of this 
sum would come in the form of noncash technical assistance and im-
port subsidies, but the sheer dollar volume alone is impressive, and 
could make a major impact.l85 
As a second necessary mechanism to implement this proposal, the 
treaties must establish some objective basis for determining which 
countries, by virtue of their relative wealth, would be required to be 
donors, which ones would be eligible to be recipients, and which ones 
would be neither donors nor recipients. Various types of criteria could 
be adapted for drawing these lines. 186 For example, each treaty party 
whose annual United Nations dues amounted to more than one percent 
of the UN's total budget might be required to contribute to the devel-
opment fund, according to each state's particular ability to pay.187 Sim-
reduce the overall size ofUnited States armed forces. See Gulf Crisis Poses Dilemma for 
U.S. Military Facing Cutbacks, Wash. Post, Dec. 23, 1990, at AI, col. 2. Even in the 
midst of the Desert Storm fighting, American defense officials were preparing reduced 
future military budgets, extending the downward trend in defense spending. See Amid 
War, Pentagon Proposes Cuts, Wash. Post, Feb. 2, 1991, at A4, col. 1; Morrison, Schizo-
phrenic Budget, 23 Nat'IJ. 326, 326-30 (1991). 
184. Cf. lA I. Thorsson, supra note 176, at 316 (assuming that Sweden could 
devote to augmented international development efforts approximately 10% of savings it 
might realize from reduced military budgeting pursuant to future disarmament treaties). 
185. Some have expressed reservations about linking development with disarma-
ment too rigidly on the grounds that each issue ought to be pursued as vigorously as 
possible without either one being held up by difficulties in the other, and that the needs 
for development assistance are, at least in the short run, much greater than the amount 
of funds that could reasonably be released by foreseeable arms control measures. See 
Final Document, supra note 70, ~ 8, at 373; [1987] 12 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 350, U.N. 
Sales No. E.88.1X.2 (1987) (summarizing statement of France). 
186. Some earlier studies have proposed that donations of development aid could 
be based upon the size of each donor's military budget or on the volume of its interna-
tional arms transfers. See Disarmament and Development, supra note 73, at 144-47; 
Fontanel, supra note 160, at 23. We prefer a program based strictly upon each state's 
financial ability to pay, which more accurately takes into account the situation of states, 
such as Japan, that have affiuent economies and low levels of military activity. 
187. The General Assembly establishes the scale of assessments for the apportion-
ment of the expenses of the organization, and in 1990 the following member states each 
were assessed greater than one percent of the total budget: Australia (1.57%), Belgium 
(1.17%), Brazil (1.45%), Canada (3.09%), France (6.25%), German Democratic Repub-
lic (1.28%), Federal Republic of Germany (8.08%), Italy (3.99%), Japan (11.38%), 
Netherlands (1.65%), Saudi Arabia (1.02%), Spain (1.95%), Sweden (1.21%), Ukraine 
(1.25%), Soviet Union (9.99%), United Kingdom (4.86%), and United States (25.00%). 
G.A. Res. 223,43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49), U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1989). There are 
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ilarly, each party whose per capita income or per capita gross national 
product ranked among the poorest sixty percent of the world could be 
eligible to become a recipient.l88 Parties whose financial position fell 
between these extremes could elect to become donors but not recipi-
ents. The United States, Japan, and Western Europe would therefore 
be the principal donors for the foreseeable future; they should collabo-
rate among themselves--driven by the fear of a rapidly arming world-
to ensure that the cost burden is equitably shared among all the leading 
developed states. 
Other difficult questions involve apportioning the available annual 
funds among the recipients. Although no method is perfect, we favor 
an allocation system designed to focus on the economic need of each 
particular recipient, as influenced by both its population and its per 
capita income or wealth.189 
While the mechanics of such a scheme may be complicated, it still 
seems superior to other possible allocation algorithms. For example, 
the idea of providing an equal share of the funds to each recipient party 
that is in compliance with its treaty obligations would have the advan-
some anomalies on this list, but it provides a good starting point for developing a list of 
states that should contribute to the development fund. See also International Disarma-
ment Fund, supra note 71, at 18 (describing various proposals for heavily armed and 
economically advanced states to provide most of support for international development 
programs). 
188. Statistics provided by the World Bank list 42 countries as "low income econo-
mies," with per capita gross national product less than $500. Another 35 countries are 
considered "lower middle income," with per capita gross national product between 
$500 and $2000. These two categories embrace 64% of the 120 reporting countries, 
and a comparable percentage of the world's population. See International Bank for Re-
construction and Development/fhe World Bank, World Development Report 1989, at 
164-65 (1989). Again, there are a few surprises, but the ranking system provides a via-
ble starting point for allocating the payments. See A Programme for Survival, supra 
note 2, at 78 (focusing on 29 poorest countries, concentrated in two "poverty belts"), 
But see P.T. Bauer, supra note 72, at 53-54 (arguing that it is misleading to compare 
income levels across different states). 
189. In principle, the allocation formula could also take into account a recipient's 
ability, and its prior record, at making productive use of international development 
funds, and could also accord preferences to states that had particularly compelling local 
programs. This feature could help reduce waste and inefficiency, ensuring that the de-
velopment purposes of the overall program were being realized. At the same time, any 
formula that relied upon someone's judgment about whether the development funds 
were being properly utilized might become so political and controversial that it would 
detract from the program's arms control purposes. 
Each developing state will have its own needs and resources, and a unique package 
of assistance should be fashioned for each. On the other hand, some needs are likely to 
be quite similar from country to country, and in many instances a regional approach to 
the problems may offer greater opportunities. See D. Fischer, supra note 65, at II; see 
also International Disarmament Fund, supra note 71, at 25-26 (suggesting criteria for 
setting priorities among recipient states); Disarmament and Development, supra note 
73, at 151 (considering which states should be prime beneficiaries of international devel-
opment fund). 
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tage of the greatest simplicity, but it seems arbitrary: it does not focus 
on either the problem of disarmament or the needs for development. 
An alternative, allocating a greater proportion of funds to those nations 
that pose the greatest potential military danger, such as those deemed 
most likely to "hold out" against the treaty and deploy the destabilizing 
weapons, would be even worse. Such a system might have a surface 
plausibility, in targeting the incentive scheme directly to deter the most 
provocative countries. But that approach would become counter-
productive in the long run by instituting a perverse incentive to "build 
up to build down": a state could increase its share of the multilateral 
funds by cynically teetering on the brink of making the prohibited 
deployment. 
It might be possible for the treaty document to avoid specifying 
any allocation criteria at all, leaving it to the parties, in unbounded peri-
odic bargaining over the implementation of the agreement, to specify 
via a political process the percentage of funds that would be allocated 
to each eligible recipient. This system, however, would have the flaws 
of both the plans discussed above: it would be perceived as arbitrary 
and chaotic,190 and it would encourage a feigned interest in acquiring 
the advanced military technology as a bargaining chip. 
Among the simpler allocation systems, therefore, the best plan 
would be to apportion the available funds according to the poverty and 
population of the recipient countries. No system can perfectly reflect 
the relative needs of all countries, but it should be feasible to approxi-
mate a fair and rational basis of distribution. Under this plan, to be 
sure, many countries that lack the desire or the capability to produce 
the banned weapons would nonetheless collect the development funds 
and thereby get a "free ride" on the developed countries' disarmament 
concerns. But to the extent that the system is at least in part a true 
international economic aid program providing the additional benefit of 
preventing new arms races, this "unearned" benefit should be of rela-
tively little concern, particularly since we must appreciate that in the 
190. Multilateral arms control negotiations, conducted through the United Nations 
or elsewhere, tend to be marked by rhetoric and procedural wrangling, but they some-
times have been effective nonetheless. See Maynes, supra note 167, at 52-72; Luck, A 
Future for Multilateral Arms Control, in Arms Control: The Multilateral Alternative, 
supra note 18, at 213, 218. To earn the respect-and the continued support-of the 
donor states, the disarmament organizations will have to find a way to avoid becoming 
encumbered by the bureaucracy and divisiveness that have sometimes characterized 
other multilateral organizations. See International Disarmament Fund, supra note 71, 
at 27. In some instances, perceptions of extraneous politicization, hostility toward 
Western values, and irresponsible budgeting have led to important defections, such as 
the United States' 1984 withdrawal from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization. See Newell, Perspectives on the U.S. Withdrawal from 
UNESCO, Address by Assistant Secretary of State, Oct. 31, 1984, reprinted as Dep't of 
State Current Policy No. 634; cf. P.T. Bauer, supra note 72, at 66-68 (multilateral orga-
nizations are wasteful, inefficient, and politically biased). 
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long run, countries develop, technology spreads, and governments 
change, so any country may pose potential security problems. 
V. OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSAL 
A radical suggestion such as ours is bound to stimulate a variety of 
objections. In this Part, we attempt to deal with four of the most pow-
erful counterarguments against the program outlined above. 
A. Morality 
Some will no doubt complain that it is improper to "bribe" other 
states in this way, that injecting cash or conditioned in-kind benefits so 
overtly into the statecraft of sovereign nations impermissibly cheapens 
the vaunted traditions of international relations. In the same vein, 
some will resent this type of application of economic leverage, consid-
ering it to be just as aggressive and improper as a direct application of 
coercive military power.I9I 
We look upon these transactions as business propositions, how-
ever, and we see a world of difference between a personal, under-the-
table emolument to a nation's leader and a program of financial aid that 
is overt, dedicated to a high public purpose, and freely agreed upon 
among independent states. "Immorality" is not inherent in all uncon-
ventional arrangements between willing sellers and willing buyers, and 
both groups of participating states here would be seeking symbiotically 
to promote national and global interests. 
From the point of view of the developed states, the acute future 
military threats to peace and security will increasingly originate in de-
veloping countries that deploy advanced weapons systems. It is surely 
legitimate for the developed societies to anticipate this emerging dan-
ger and to attempt to protect themselves from it. If persuasion and 
ordinary military means of self-defense are insufficient, it is "moral"-
indeed, it is the only responsible course of action-to attempt to bring 
other assets into play. When the developed states can "buy" national 
security at a much lower price than in the past, by shipping aid and 
assistance to wavering countries and providing those recipients with ad-
ditional incentives to persuade them to foreswear pursuit of new desta-
bilizing weaponry, then the international community ought to applaud 
the creativity and nonviolence of the new approach. 
From the point of view of the developing states, as "sellers" of 
disarmament, a bargain along these lines would be unattractive at any 
price if it genuinely reduced their safety or autonomy. But there is no 
inherent reason why an increase in the security of the developed na-
tions should decrease the security of other countries. Most threats to 
third world countries are posed not by the developed world but by 
191. See Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality Under 
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 983 (1974). 
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other third world countries;192 for many states, therefore, verifiable 
multilateral arms control agreements with economic incentives added 
will be militarily as well as financially advantageous. Indeed, because 
regional instability often feeds on the fear that rival states might obtain 
new nuclear, chemical, or other advanced arms, the opportunity to curb 
or prevent future arms races in high-technology weapons is of the ut-
most importance to developing states.193 If those apprehensions can 
be reliably put aside through verifiable arms limitation agreements-a 
strategy that has achieved some successes, 194 but one that, in the ab-
sence of sufficiently attractive economic development incentives has 
not yet been widely adapted-then the developing states should be 
freer to turn their attention away from defense and toward urgent do-
mestic needs. 195 
There is, to be sure, a lingering distaste for giving and accepting 
handouts, 196 and any charity that is linked to a required response is 
perhaps less generous than an unrestricted donation. But the fact re-
mains that string-free subsidies have not been forthcoming from the 
developed states, and the best recourse at this time for the developing 
states to achieve the levels of foreign support that they so desperately 
need is to connect this support with the self-interest of the donors. 
Our concept could thus unite the several countries of the world in 
mutually advantageous multilateral disarmament at the same time that 
it reinforces their shared progress toward economic betterment. While 
some may hesitate to reduce the perquisites of national sovereignty to 
crass dollar terms, we consider a frank recognition of the relationship-
and a concrete effort to deal productively with the needs of all states-
the most morally responsible approach to effective management of the 
problems of the twenty-first century. 
192. See Pipart & Sada, supra note 76, at 102; Wilson & Wallensteen, supra note 
57, at 285-98. 
193. See D. Fischer, supra note 65, at 13, 30-36. 
194. See, e.g., Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 23 (providing nonnuclear regime 
for entirety of Latin America). 
195. Cf. Disarmament and Development, supra note 73, at 90 (developing states 
will have to rechannel domestic spending away from military purposes to promote eco-
nomic growth); Palme Commission Report, supra note 47, at 91 (concluding that mili-
tary spending, in developing states as well as in developed economies, reduces economic 
growth by usurping resources that would otherwise be available for domestic invest-
ment); Klare, supra note 13, at 8-12 (analyzing regional and domestic political pressures 
that lead to counterproductive arms races among developing states). 
196. Despite the relatively low political popularity offoreign assistance legislation, 
opinion polls reveal that a majority of Americans favors providing foreign aid, and pri-
vate American charitable donations reveal a deep internationalist humanitarian spirit, 
caring about poverty abroad as much as about poverty at home. On a per capita basis, 
individual American donations for overseas relief and development are "among the 
highest in the world." Sewell & Contee, supra note 74, at 1020. 
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B. Political Acceptability 
Our proposal will have to surmount diverse political attacks from 
many quarters. In some recipient countries, leaders will be accused of 
selling out their nations' patrimonial independence for a mess of pot-
tage. In some paying countries, leaders could be criticized for wasting 
national revenues to pay other states to do what they should and would 
do anyway. In some countries that would be neither payers nor recipi-
ents, there might be complaints that poorer states were being unfairly 
advantaged. 
The steps that have already been outlined should help to make the 
proposal more politically tolerable. But the critical issue remains the 
plausibility of attempting to cut a mutually beneficial deal: those (in 
either the developed or the developing states) who believe that "we 
should not be doing business with those people" will never be tolerant 
of our approach.I97 For some, the regimes in other parts of the world 
are so hateful and repugnant that it is inconceivable that areas of 
shared interests could or should be identified and exploited.198 We, 
obviously, have come to the opposite conclusion: despite the enor-
mous social, political, economic, racial, and cultural differences be-
tween states, they have some concerns in common; thus, a balanced set 
of tradeoffs may enable everyone to emerge a winner. The ultimate 
response, then, to the question of political acceptability will itself be a 
political measurement: if the program works-if it achieves its pur-
poses of arms control and economic growth for the developed and for 
the developing states-then it will be a political success, too.I99 
In the context of political tolerability, it is also worth contrasting 
the program that we advocate here with the previous, more general in-
ternational efforts, sponsored by the United Nations and other groups, 
to link disarmament and development. 200 Both arms control and im-
197. Accepting the type of deal we propose does not require the states to overlook 
or downplay their other outstanding antagonisms. The United States will be able to 
continue to oppose repressive, hostile regimes around the world, and to resist and un-
dermine outlaw states and rogue leaders through a variety of policy devices. Our ap-
proach, however, recognizes that along with these profound differences, we can identify 
certain areas of shared interests, and that we should be able to find ways to pursue the 
mutual goals at the same time that we maintain our adversary dealings in other contexts. 
Thus, there is no necessary linkage between progress on the problems of development 
and disarmament and progress on the host of other international issues, such as territo-
rial disputes or human rights concerns. 
198. See, e.g., P.T. Bauer, supra note 72, at 42-43 (criticizing West for providing 
aid to radical regimes, as creating "a collective rod for its own chastisement"). 
199. Cf. A Programme for Survival, supra note 2, at 27-28 (after surveying leading 
states, commission concludes there is sufficient political will to address problems of de-
velopment seriously). 
200. The United Nations and other groups have underscored, since at least 1950, 
the political and economic association between development and disarmament, and nu-
merous studies and resolutions have advocated reduced military expenditures coupled 
with increased resource transfers to the developing world. See Deger, supra note 67, at 
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proved living standards are principal goals articulated in the United Na-
tions Charter,201 and the General Assembly has for a generation 
sponsored a series of resolutions202 and investigations2°3 that have 
unanimously concluded that the problems are inextricably linked: 
"The world can either continue to pursue the arms race with character-
istic vigor or move consciously and with deliberate speed toward a 
more stable and balanced social and economic development within a 
more sustainable international economic and political order. 1t cannot 
do both."204 The global community, therefore, has repeatedly called 
upon the advanced economies, and especially upon the superpowers, to 
restrain their military spending and dedicate the newfound bounty as 
additional aid to the poor.2os 
Nevertheless, the developed states have remained largely unre-
sponsive to these pleas; asjurgen Brauer has noted, the argument link-
ing development and disarmament seems to have lost political 
521-23; [1987] 12 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 339-44, U.N. Sales No. E.88.1X.2 (1987); 
U.N. Inst. for Disarmament Research, Repertory of Disarmament Research 71 (1982) 
[hereinafter Repertory of Disarmament Research]; Disarmament and Development, 
supra note 73, at 136-40. 
201. The preamble to the United Nations Charter notes the states' determination 
"to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war," "to promote social progress 
and better standards oflife," "to practise tolerance and live together in peace," and "to 
employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advance-
ment of all peoples." U.N. Charter preamble. 
202. See Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, G.A. Res. 37/84, 
37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) (98th plen. mtg.) at 69, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982); Eco-
nomic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race and Its Extremely Harmful Ef-
fects on World Peace and Security, G.A. Res. 3075, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) 
(2192d plen. mtg.) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973). 
203. Repertory of Disarmament Research, supra note 200, at 75 n. *. Prominent 
among the recent international inquiries into the connection between arms control and 
economic growth are the 1982 study by a distinguished group of governmental experts, 
sponsored by the United Nations under the leadership of Sweden's Inga Thorsson, see 
Disarmament and Development, supra note 73; a 1984 United Nations study of the pos-
sibility of creating a multilateral trust fund to aid economic growth, paid for by savings 
in military budgets, see International Disarmament Fund, supra note 71; the two impor-
tant reports of the Brandt Commission, see A Programme for Survival, supra note 2, at 
117-25, and Indep. Comm'n on Int'l Dev. Issues, Common Crisis North-South: Coop-
eration for World Recovery, Report of Brandt Commission 37-38 (1985); and the Palme 
Commission Report, supra note 47, at 173-74. 
204. Disarmament and Development, supra note 73, at 161; accord Final Docu-
ment, supra note 70, 11 4, at 373. 
205. See Repertory of Disarmament Research, supra note 200, at 71-74; Disarma-
ment and Development, supra note 73, at I71-76. At the 1987 conference, the Soviet 
Union proposed that each future arms control accord should be accompanied by a state-
ment of its financial implications, indicating how much money it will save and what per-
centage of those funds would be dedicated to development assistance. See [1987] 12 
U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 353. U.N. Sales No. E.88.IX.2 (1987); see also International 
Disarmament Fund, supra note 71, at 19-25 (discussing various possibilities for taxing 
wealthy and heavily armed states to support development efforts). 
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momentum during the 1980s.206 The United States refused even to 
attend the latest major international conference exploring the associa-
tion between disarmament and development, convened in New York in 
1987.207 A major explanation for this consistent lack of support must 
again be the independent national calculations of self-interest: in the 
resource-shifting programs advocated by the United Nations, there is 
little obvious or immediate benefit drawing the wealthy states to partici-
pate. 208 It is only natural for the developed states to resist the interna-
tional community's efforts to reach uninvited into the seemingly 
deepest pockets; when the donor states would get nothing in return for 
providing the additional aid, the appeals for development assistance 
will be ignored. 2 09 
Our program, on the other hand, provides a sound incentive for 
the developed states: what is in it for them is a world-wide commitment 
to the specific measures of multilateral disarmament that can build a 
safe and stable environment for international commerce and culture. 
Instead of earning simply the warm, rosy feeling from doing charitable 
work, the developed states under our proposal would receive broadly 
based, meaningful security assurances that cannot be obtained in other 
206. See Brauer, Reviving or Revamping the Disarmament-for-Development The-
sis?, Bull. Peace Proposals, Sept. 1990, at 307, 308-09. 
207. The International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and 
Development was convened by the United Nations August 24-September 11, 1987, 
culminating several years of preparations. It was attended by 150 states and its final 
report has become one of the leading documents in the field. The United States de-
clined to attend the conference, stating that disarmament and development were two 
distinct issues that could not be considered appropriately in terms of an interrelation· 
ship. See [1987] 12 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 342-44, 371, U.N. Sales No. E.88.1X.2 
(1987); Deger, supra note 67, at 523. 
208. The developing world has long sponsored proposals for a "New International 
Economic Order," and the United Nations General Assembly has endorsed the concepts 
of greater sharing of natural resources and greater power for the developing countries. 
See G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), 6 (Spec.) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.1) (2229th plen. mtg.) at 3, 
U.N. Doc. N9559 (1974); G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI), 6 (Spec.) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. I) 
(22x9th plen. mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1984); Disarmament and Development, 
supra note 73, at 32-37; P. Harrison, supra note 70, at 26. However, meaningful pro-
gress toward actual implementation of this new economic order has been completely 
blocked. See International Disarmament Fund, supra note 71, at 4; Ivanov, Disarma-
ment, Detente and Development: The Dialectics of Interplay, Disarmament, Spring 
1986, at 36, 45; W.W. Rostow, supra note 75, at 116. 
209. In opening the 1987 conference, the Secretary-General acknowledged that it 
was simplistic to suppose that reduced military expenditures by the developed states 
would automatically lead to increases in their development aid to other states, but he 
argued that both disarmament and development should proceed on their own timeta-
bles, as rapidly as possible. See [1987] 12 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 348, U.N. Sales No. 
E.88.IX.2 (1987). Nevertheless, the major thrust of these and other efforts to date to 
link arms control and economic growth have been little more than demands for re-
source-shifting, with no concrete returns to the states that would provide the funds. Cf. 
Final Document, supra note 70, 1111 31, 32, at 376 (resources released via disarmament 
should be devoted to development). 
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ways.210 Each group of states would give what it can, in exchange for 
the type of international behavior that it needs the most. Unlike the 
previous, largely illusory linkage sponsored over the years hy the 
United Nations, this is a realistic, politically attractive bargain for both 
sides. 
C. Precedents 
Because the world has no experience-beyond the inadequate 
model of the NPT211-with an overt linkage between multilateral dis-· 
armament and the explicit financial underwriting of third world devel-
opment, some will be apprehensive about the plunge into uncharted 
political currents. When examined more carefully, however, there are 
ample illustrations of the adoption of similar types of strategies in cog-
nate circumstances-using money freely as an instrument of foreign 
policy-providing some guidance for our program and some prece-
dents for its success. 
The leaders of developed nations do not often, in their interna-
tional addresses, brag about having purchased security by paying other 
countries or by threatening withdrawals of aid if the recipients become 
too obstreperous. However, these themes are common in domestic de-
bates about foreign assistance, and have frequently driven the diplo-
matic calculations of the United States. Wielding money as a club to 
induce other states to alter their internal or international policies can 
be a tricky proposition, but it is frequently adopted. In recent years, 
the United States has, for example, denied trade benefits to Paragnay 
because of systematic human rights abuses there,212 invoked "Super 
301" trade sanctions against japan because of its failure to adopt poli-
cies that would lead to higher levels of American exports,213 and sus-
pended aid and other payments to Panama because of acrimony with 
the Noriega regime.2I4 
Sometimes the links between giving foreign aid and obtaining mili-
tary advantages have been even more explicit. Several international 
agreements between the United States and other countries have pro-
vided that, in exchange for security-related privileges such as the right 
to operate military bases on another country's soil, the United States 
government would endeavor to provide additional foreign assistance to 
210. But cf. Beilenson, supra note 68, at 843 (history suggests that foreign aid will 
not succeed where it is offered with vague intention of purchasing general influence or 
friendship). 
211. See supra text accompanying notes 164-172. 
212. See Paraguayan Asks Special Trade Status, Wash. Post,June 16, 1990, at Al7, 
col. 6. 
213. See Auerbach, U.S. Won't Retaliate Against India on Trade, Wash. Post, june 
14, 1990, at Cl, col. 5. 
214. See Goshko, U.S. Denies Recognition to Panama, Wash. Post, Sept. 2, 1989, at 
Al, col. 1. 
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the host government.215 For example, the 1983 Agreement on Defense 
and Economic Cooperation between Greece and the United States216 
provided that the United States would be permitted to maintain valua-
ble military bases on Greek soil and that the United States would, in 
return, "assist in the modernization and maintenance of Greek defen-
sive capabilities."217 When that deal was struck, the U.S. executive 
branch promptly requested Congress to allocate a half a billion dollars 
in financing for the Greek armed forces "on terms particularly 
favorable to Greece."218 Subsequently, when that five-year agreement 
expired, the United States and Greece struggled through seventeen 
rounds of negotiations before again finding a formula leading to re-
newal. The new eight-year package calls for, inter alia, $345 million in 
annual aid to Greece, a donation of about $1 billion worth of surplus 
military materiel, and the waiver of some $50 million owed to the 
United States on previous Greek military purchases.2 • 9 
More broadly, the concept of using financial inducements to 
achieve foreign policy goals has recently been adopted, or attempted, 
in other sectors as well.220 There have been numerous proposals for 
"debt for nature" swaps, under which the wealthy states would write off 
sizeable loans or provide other forms of relief for poverty-stricken 
states who might otherwise be forced by cost considerations to adopt 
national industrialization policies that jeopardize the regional or global 
environment.221 For example, India's Rajiv Gandhi, while prime minis-
215. The United States provides extraordinary support for countries hosting an 
American military presence, such as Greece, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, and Tur-
key. While the overall American foreign aid program rose only slowly during the early 
1980s, assistance to these "base rights" countries jumped nearly 60%, reaching $1.5 
billion in 1987. See Obey & Lancaster, supra note 81, at 152; Stanfield, supra note 75, 
at 1224; see also Tyler, U.S. Near Agreement to Base Aircraft, Ships in Singapore, 
Wash. Post, july 6, 1990, at A26, col. 1 (United States is negotiating basing agreement 
with Singapore, in case longstanding agreement with Philippines is not extended). 
216. Agreement on Defense and Economic Cooperation, Sept. 8, 1983, United 
States-Greece, T.I.A.S. No. 10,814. 
217. 1d., art. VIII, T.l.A.S. No. 10,814, at 5. 
The United States maintains four major bases and twenty smaller installations in 
Greece. See Goshko, U.S., Greece Conclude New 8-Year Bases Pact, Wash. Post, May 
31, 1990, at A35, col. 1. 
218. Letter to Yiannis P. Capsis, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of 
Greece, from Alan D. Berlind, Charge d'Affaires ad interim, U.S. Embassy, Greece (Sept. 
8, 1983) (on file with Columbia Law Review). A year later, Congress granted Greece 
$500 million in military aid. See Pear, Panel Deadlocks on Spending Bill, N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 6, 1984, at A1, col. 5, A5, col. 1; Tolchin, Conferees Agree on Spending Bill, End-
ing Deadlock, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1984, at A1, col. 6. 
219. See U.S., Greece Sign Agreement on Military Bases, Wash. Post, july 9, 1990, 
at A16, col. 1; Goshko, supra note 217, at A35, col. 1. 
220. Most obviously, the United States has been quick to extend significant finan-
cial support to the new leaders in Panama and Nicaragna, with the Bush Administration 
moving to provide up to $800 million in new aid to states that evicted regimes that the 
United States had opposed. Seej. Baker, supra note 11, at 2. • 
221. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 33 ("India may phase out the use of 
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ter, called for creation of an $18 billion international environment fund 
to develop and promote technologies that could facilitate exploitation 
of natural resources without environmental degradation.222 Similarly, 
the Bush Administration recently reversed course and endorsed an 
emerging treaty that would create a $100 to $250 million trust fund to 
assist developing countries in adopting substitute technologies to per-
mit less reliance upon ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons in refriger-
ation and other functions.22s 
chlorofluorocarbons, China may moderate its burning of coal, Brazil may stop the de-
struction of its Amazon rainforest, but only at a price. That price will be new forms of 
multilateral assistance."); Gibson & Curtis, A Debt-for-Nature Blueprint, 28 Colum. J. 
Transnat'l L. 33I, 335-53 (I990). 
222. See Worsnip, Gandhi Proposes Environment Fund at Non-Aligned Summit, 
Reuter Library Report, Sept. 5, I989 (LEXIS, Nexis library, CURRNT file). Gandhi's 
Planet Protection Fund would come under United Nations auspices and would support 
research into environmentally sound technologies, to be supplied free of charge to 
member states. See id.; see also Planet-Protection Costs, Boston Globe, Sept. 8, I989, 
at 14, col. I (editorial endorsing concept, but noting that it will probably not succeed in 
attracting political support or substantial funding). 
223. See Morning Edition (Nat'l Public Radio broadcast, May II, I990) (transcript 
on file with Columbia Law Review); Frankel, Governments Agree on Ozone Fund, 
Wash. Post, June 30, I990, at AI, col. 6; Weisskopf, U.S. Drops Opposition To CFC 
Phaseout Fund, Wash. Post, June 16, 1990, at AI, col. 5. In the 1987 Montreal Protocol, 
54 countries have agreed to reduce by half their production of chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs), used in refrigerators, aerosol sprays, and other consumer products, because 
these chemicals were recognized as dangerous to the global atmosphere. See Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. I6, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 
(entered into force Jan. I, I989). More recently, the harm to the ozone layer has been 
revealed to be even greater th;m previously thought, and efforts have accelerated to 
induce additional countries to sign the Montreal Protocol (especially the developing 
countries, where production of CFCs is expected to increase sharply) and to enhance 
that treaty by cutting back still further on the use of the hazardous chemicals. The 
United States initially played a leading role in the negotiations, and helped design the 
plan for funding developing states who would agree to convert to use of environmen-
tally sound, but more expensive, alternatives to CFCs. In May I990, however, the Bush 
Administration reversed course on the trust fund, leading an Indian spokesperson to 
comment that India and other similar countries were then unlikely to join the Protocol, 
and a Norwegian environment official to suggest that under those circumstances it 
would be difficult to persuade developing states to make the financial sacrifices neces-
sary to promote environmental quality. 
However, the United States partially changed policy again, in June I990, under in-
tense international and domestic political pressure, avoiding becoming the only nation 
to oppose creating a trust fund of some sort. White House Chief of Staff John H. 
Sununu, who had resisted the proposal on the grounds of cost and the precedent it 
might establish in support of other types of aid to developing states, announced that the 
United States would now support the assistance program because it met the "essential 
criteria" of having adequate scientific evidence of the harms caused by CFCs, strong 
evidence that the fund would successfully address the problem, and a reasonable and 
predictable level of expenditures needed. See Weisskopf, supra, at AI, col. 5; 
Weisskopf, Conferees Agree on Ozone Plan, Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 1990, at A4, col. I; 
Cahan, Fixing the Hole Where the Rays Come In, Bus. Week, july 2, I990, at 58, 58. 
Our proposal for similarly linking disarmament and development could pass those same 
types of tests. 
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1n other instances, too, the United States and other developed 
countries have agreed to pay substantial sums of money to the develop-
ing states to help induce them to adopt policies and programs that 
serve mutual interests. Whether the poorer states would have followed 
the enlightened course anyway, or whether they could have afforded 
anything more than a short-sighted perspective, is unclear in each in-
stance, but the logrolling has been successful. In the World Health Or-
ganization, for example, the United States has provided assistance to 
developing states to encourage the implementation of public health 
programs that combat disease and epidemics; the most immediate ben-
eficiaries are the local populations, but all states are advantaged when 
mass illness is reduced.224 Similarly, through the International Civil 
Aviation Organization, the United States has provided funds to aid 
other states in the construction and enforcement of antihijacking and 
antiterrorism equipment and training, again supporting a set of meas-
ures that redounds to the benefit of both the recipient and donor.225 
The most dramatic current illustration of using money as a grease 
for easing international relations may be the 1990 arrangements 
through which Western countries will be providing billions of dollars in 
loans and credits to the Soviet Union in exchange for the U.S.S.R.'s 
withdrawing its objections to NATO membership for the reunited Ger-
many-in jim Hoagland's terms, "a bribe worth giving."226 The allies 
authorized each state to pursue its own course regarding assistance to 
Moscow, and although the United States seems unlikely to offer any-
thing beyond technical advice in the near term, other states have hur-
ried to do more.227 West Germany, in particular, has pledged up to $8 
billion in aid to the U.S.S.R., prompting President Gorbachev to reori-
ent Soviet policy and acquiesce in the enlargement of the Western 
alliance. 228 
The United States has shown no compunctions about marshalling 
monetary assets to advance its Middle East policy, as evidenced by Pres-
ident Bush's recent public offer of financial assistance to jordan's King 
Hussein, to attempt to enlist his support for United Nations economic 
sanctions against Iraq.229 Shortly thereafter, the United States unilat-
224. See UNESCO Youth Institute, Toward Mankind's Better Health 27-32 (1963). 
225. See Ott, ICAO Upgrades Security Unit as Part of Antiterrorist Effort, Aviation 
Week & Space Tech., May 1, 1989, at 109. 
226. Hoagland, Uniting Gennany: A Little 'Bribery', Wash. Post, July 3, 1990, at 
A23, col. 1. 
227. See Suro, Summit Is Divided on Aid to Moscow, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1990, at 
AI, col. 5; Hoffman, Bush Holds Off on Economic Aid to Soviets, Wash. Post, June 30, 
1990, at A23, col. 3; Moore, Cheney Would Tie Aid to Soviet Military Cuts, Wash. Post, 
June 26, I990, at AI7, col. I. 
228. See Fisher, Bonn to Pay $8 Billion for Soviet Troops in E. Gennany, Wash. 
Post, Sept. 11, I990, at AI4, col. I; Lee, Gorbachev Drops Objection to United Ger-
many in NATO, Wash. Post, July I7, I990, at AI, col. 4. 
229. See Tyler, Bush Offers Aid to Jordan Iflraq Embargo Honored, Wash. Post, 
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erally forgave Egypt's $7 billion debt, as an expression of appreciation 
for the leading role that President Mubarak played in rallying Arab sup-
port for the American resistance to the invasion of Kuwait. 230 And the 
United States has also used the withdrawal of financial assistance as 'a 
policy tool for punishing states that pursue policies contrary to Ameri-
can objectives: when Yemen voted against the United States-sponsored 
United Nations Security Council resolution to authorize the use of 
force against Iraq in December 1990, "a senior American diplomat was 
instructed to tell [a Yemeni diplomat] 'That was the most expensive no 
vote you ever cast'-meaning that it would result in an end to 
America's more than $70 million in foreign aid to Yemen."231 Other 
forms of economic assistance tied to foreign states' domestic political 
decisions in other contexts, including incentive deals solely between 
the developed states,232 have also been implemented.233 
It requires only a short conceptual leap to move from providing 
economic assistance in exchange for basing rights, trade policies, or 
environmental protection to providing similar assistance in exchange 
for arms limitation. The dangers of the spread of technologically so-
Aug. 15, 1990, at A1, col. 4. Jordan is heavily dependent upon trade with Iraq, and any 
decision to conform to the Security Council's mandatory embargo on Iraq would strain 
the fragile Jordanian economy. At the same time, Jordanian nonparticipation would rob 
the sanctions package of much of its impact, easing the pressure upon Iraq. The United 
States quickly offered to insert money into Jordan's calculations, proposing to provide 
direct financial support if Jordan would support the United Nations policy. See id. 
230. See Friedman, Baker Foresees a Long Stay for U.S. Troops in Mideast; Urges 
a Regional Alliance: Egypt Debt Erased, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1990, at AI, col. 6. The 
United States also facilitated India's receipt of loans from the International Monetary 
Fund in return for Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar modifying India's foreign policy and 
permitting American transport planes to refuel in India en route to the Desert Storm 
fighting. See Coli, Policy on U.S. Planes Threatens India's Leader, Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 
1991, at A32, col. 2. 
231. Friedman, How U.S. Won Support to Use Mideast Forces, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 
1990, § 1, at 1, col. 5. 
232. Recently the United States announced that it would give $1 million each to 
Canada and Switzerland for their assistance in obtaining the guilty plea of a Panamanian 
bank in the largest money-laundering prosecution in American history. The reward was 
described as part of a new program to elicit greater international cooperation in tracing 
the flows of drug money, providing an incentive for states to relax their traditional se-
crecy regarding banking transactions that could be used to shield illegal proceeds. See 
Isikoff, U.S. to Pay Nations for Aid in Drug Case, Wash. Post,- Aug. 15, 1989, atA14, col. 
1. 
233. Other countries have also demonstrated a propensity to utilize economic 
power to pursue political ends. For example, the 1973 oil embargo was an attempt by 
several Arab states to influence other nations' policies toward Israel. See Comment, 
supra note 191, at 983-84. More recently, there have been repo_rts that Israel was pre-
paring an arms sale to Argentina, on terms favorable to the purchasers, in exchange for 
Argentina's breaking off its program of cooperation with Egypt in the development of 
ballistic missiles. See British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, 
Argentina Newspaper Says Condor Project with Egypt Cancelled for Sake of Israeli 
Deal, Apr. 6, 1989 (LEXIS, Nexis library, CURRNT file). 
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phisticated weapons are not too dissimilar from the dangers of the 
spread of terrorism or illicit drugs. In each instance, the wealthy states 
can pay the poorer states to support enforcement programs that will 
benefit everyone. The concept of negotiating an economic quid pro 
quo to promote United States national security is therefore hardly revo-
lutionary. The strategy of adapting that process-in direct, overt mech-
anisms-to serve the achievement of multilateral disarmament should 
not now be too shocking. 
The success and pervasiveness of these partial precedents could 
support an argument even broader than the one we make: one could 
assert that the principle oflinking disarmament measures with develop-
ment assistance ought to be applied not only in future arms control 
agreements, but immediately, through existing programs of bilateral 
foreign aid and through contemporary multilateral assistance adminis-
tered by the World Bank,234 the International Monetary Fund (IMF},235 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,236 and 
others. Because these institutions already carry such substantial weight 
in international economic relations, it might be advantageous to enlist 
them, too, to support if not to implement our program. 
Certainly, the aid program we propose must be fully coordinated 
with the existing bilateral and multilateral development enterprises al-
ready in place.237 Judicious application of all available international fi-
nancial tools will help avoid waste and attain the maximum political 
impact. But the existing programs are simply insufficient to deal with 
the immense challenges of fostering economic development, even 
before the concerns of disarmament are factored in. Current coopera-
tive development efforts are certainly substantial-the World Bank tar-
get for the current fiscal year is $16 to $18 billion in regular bank loans 
and another $5.7 billion in subsidized lending238-but they have, by 
the Bank's own calculations, fallen dangerously far behind the increas-
ing levels of need. In fact, new loans to the developing world fell in 
234. See Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Gist: The World Bank 1 
(Mar. 1989) ("The World Bank is the preeminent source of long-term official finance 
and policy advice for developing countries.") (on file with Columbia Law Review). 
235. See Bureau of Public Affairs U.S. Dep't of State, Gist: International Monetary 
Fund 1-2 (May 1989) (International Monetary Fund supports members' efforts to main-
tain orderly currency exchange rates and to harmonize trade policies and generates the 
equivalent of approximately $4 billion in loans per year to developing countries) (on file 
with Columbia Law Review). 
236. See Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Gist: Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 1-2 (Dec. 1989) (OECD's 24 members, 
including United States, Canada, and most of Western Europe, collaborate on wide 
range of issues, including provision of economic assistance to developing countries) (on 
file with Columbia Law Review). 
237. See Pipart & Sada, supra note 76, at 155 (discussing need to coordinate all 
programs of economic assistance from diverse donor states and institutions). 
238. See Rowen, Soviet Group to Meet IMF, World Bank, Wash. Post, Sept. 17, 
1990, at A17, col. 1, A18, col. 4. 
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1989 to their lowest level in ten years, and the mountain of existing 
debt imposes additional hardships upon many in the poor states.239 
With this acknowledged level of need, it is unlikely that the bulk of 
our linkage proposal could be accomplished through existing mecha-
nisms, either bilateral or multilateral. First, regarding current national 
aid programs, most states would not reliably pledge to govern their fu-
ture assistance programs in this way. The countries that now make bi-
lateral help available do so for a variety of particularistic reasons, 
including humanitarian concerns and foreign policy advantages (in-
cluding disclosed and undisclosed agreements of the kinds described 
above240). The aid is provided episodically, depending heavily upon 
transitory perceptions of national interest, 241 and states have been re-
luctant to band together in providing sustained joint assistance, or even 
to promise to continue the flow of unilateral aid. While some coun-
tries, therefore, might elect to institute on their own a linkage program 
such as the one we recommend, there is little reason to hope that many 
would do so with consistency or with the volume of assistance that we 
project would be necessary to tackle the problem. 
Second, concerning existing multilateral lending institutions, there 
are again serious questions whether their considerable financial muscle 
could, or should, be enlisted in direct support of our proposal. To be-
gin with, the World Bank and other organizations already impose nu-
merous economic conditions upon their lending, designed to make it 
likely that the loaned funds will be used productively for economic de-
velopment and that the loans will be repaid. 242 Any new disbursement 
requirements (such as those related to arms control) could not simply 
supplant these original conditions, lest countries meeting the disarma-
ment requirements become free to squander the funds received. In-
stead, the new tests would have to be imposed in addition to the 
existing ones. The resulting combination of hurdles might then be 
more than many countries would choose or be able to meet. Even from 
the perspective of the lender, it might be better strategy to continue to 
concentrate the institutions' efforts in the economic field-the subject 
239. See id. 
240. See supra text accompanying notes 211-2I9. 
241. The United States includes a wide variety of political considerations-going 
well beyond the security concerns related to arms control-in national decisions regard-
ing grants of foreign aid. For example, for a decade the United States continued to 
provide military assistance to Pakistan, despite the fact that Pakistan was seeking to de-
velop a nuclear weapons capability, because Pakistan was also providing indispensable 
support to the American effort to arm the rebels resisting Soviet domination of Afghani-
stan. See L. Spector, supra note 29, at I25. Similarly, the United States helped Iraq, 
despite Iraqi development and use of poison gas in war and against its own people, in 
order to prevent the ascendancy of Iran. See Ajami, The Summer of Arab Discomfort, 
Foreign Aff., Winter I990-9I, at I, I9. 
242. See Nelson, The Diplomacy of Policy-Based Lending, in Between Two 
Worlds: The World Bank's Next Decade 67, 71-72 (R. Feinberg ed. I986). 
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that they know the best-rather than to stretch to acquire new expertise 
and fulfill new mandates. 
More importantly, the imposition of what would surely be seen as 
"political" rather than strictly economic conditions on lending by ex-
isting multilateral institutions would undoubtedly strike many recipient 
nations as a new form of unwarranted imperialism. That is, the raw use 
of the wealthy nations' economic hegemony to impose still further 
domination on the recipients through novel World Bank intervention 
in national security issues is fundamentally different from a consensual 
tradeoff for which both sides would freely bargain in the arms control 
treaty-making process. Over the past decades, countries have come to 
expect that the World Bank's only conditions on lending will be based 
upon economic rationales and not, for example, upon determinations 
whether the recipient was sustaining a democratic form of government, 
respecting human rights, or deploying armies threatening to its neigh-
bors. Newly created financial institutions (including those to be 
founded under the treaties we envision) may plausibly include new con-
ditions in their own charters or policies, 243 but as Alexander Shakow 
points out, "from the very beginning, the nations founding the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund agreed that lending by 
these institutions should be free from political considerations."244 The 
developing countries would surely resent any belated efforts to change 
the long-standing rules and impose new political demands.245 
The World Bank's uneven record of attention to one major issue 
reaching beyond sheer economics is instructive, too. In I987, Bank 
President Barber Conable had committed the institution to sweeping 
environmental reforms, pledging that ecological concerns would as-
sume far greater prominence in the organization's plans and in its 
243. For example, the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
requires that loan recipients be market-oriented democracies and respect basic human 
rights. See I. Shibata, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Constituent Agreement, app. I, at Ill (1991). 
244. Telephone interview of Alexander Sbakow, World Bank Director of External 
Affairs (Dec. 28, 1990). It might also prove impossible, as a political matter, to amend 
the World Bank's Articles of Agreement to modify the longstanding loan policies. The 
United States and other developed countries provide the bulk of Bank funds, but under 
the organization's weighted voting system, they do not control the decision-making pro-
cess. Amendments to the Articles require acceptance by an 85% majority of the total 
voting power, which implies a very broad agreement among the members on the desira-
bility of an amendment. Id. 
245. Under one set of circumstances, it might be appropriate for the World Bank, 
IMF, and other existing multilateral lenders to require adherence to and compliance 
with arms control agreements as a condition for future lending. That is, if a new agree-
ment had such strong international support that it were nearly universal (for example, if 
only a handful of countries refused to sign it), the treaty might be said to embody a new, 
no longer controversial, international legal norm. Under those circumstances, multilat-
eral lenders might seriously consider, as a matter of policy, not extending credit to the 
few holdouts or to any countries that renounce or violate their treaty obligations, and 
there might be worldwide support for such action. 
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processes for evaluating, approving, and overseeing development 
projects. In implementing that goal, the World Bank has hired some 
sixty new environmental experts, and some noteworthy advances have 
been achieved. Yet at least some critics complain that the overall per-
formance has lagged seriously behind the promises, arguing that envi-
ronmental concerns are still a much lower priority than immediate 
economic feasibility.246 Something like our linkage proposal can be in-
stituted, therefore, not by simply grafting its principles onto existing 
programs, but only by eliciting new international mechanisms and legal 
relationships. 
D. Alternatives 
Despite these partial precedents, the program we suggest will be a 
novel departure from most previous strategies for pursuing national se-
curity. We would not sponsor it if there were less burdensome alterna-
tives that had a plausible probability of success, but unfortunately, 
existing international law has provided few other attractive models for 
dealing with these modern challenges. 
We have already discussed the inadequacies of the current config-
uration of incentives for entering arms control accords and the paucity 
of legal responses available in cases of breach.247 One other strategy 
deserves comment: the effort to retard the further dissemination of 
dangerous military technology solely through "supply side" restrictions 
on the export of goods and technology.248 Regarding nuclear,249 
chemical,250 and other weaponry,251 the advanced states have created 
246. See Rich, The Emperor's New Clothes: The World Bank and Environmental 
Reform, 7 World Pol'y J. 305, 316-25 (1990); World Comm'n on Env't and Dev., Our 
Common Future 336-39 (1987). 
247. See supra notes 105-136 and accompanying text. 
248. See D. Fischer, supra note .65, at 49-56. 
249. In 1977, a group of supplier states formed the so-called "London Club," 
which established a list of nuclear materials, equipment and technology that ought to be 
confined by international safeguards prior to export. Another group with a similar mis-
sion, the "Zangger Committee," also helps define the nuclear-related items that can be 
freely exported to all states, as well as those that require controls. See Goldblat, supra 
note 21, at 374. 
250. Since 1985, the "Australia group," composed of 15 industrialized countries, 
has met informally to coordinate national policies regarding the export of chemicals and 
equipment that might have weapons applications. By developing a uniform "trigger 
list" of controlled items, the group hopes to promote flexible, sustainable collaboration, 
avoiding the economic pressures that arise when any one state imposes ·export controls 
that are tighter than those of its economic rivals. See Ember, supra note 25, at 11. 
251. The United States and 16 other countries are-members of the Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), charged with aligning members' 
policies regarding the shipment of strategic goods and technology to the Soviet Union 
and other states. COCOM maintains a control list of embargoed items and evaluates 
individual proposed exports that might have weapons applications. See Bureau of Pub-
lic Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Gist: US Exports: Strategic Technology Controls 1-2 
(May 1989). Recently, however, the COCOM control list has been modified in impor-
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suppliers' cartels, attempting to preclude easy access to destabilizing 
arms or the components thereof.252 These measures have attained a 
significant level of success,253 but as with all oligopolies, there have 
been leaks.254 In addition, overly restrictive export controls exact a 
price on the developed countries as well, impeding commerce and 
retarding the inventiveness and cross-fertilization that accompany the 
free market in goods.255 More critically, the imposition of export con-
trols, even when they are designed in an even-handed form and applied 
without invidious discrimination, evokes profound resentment from the 
developing states, who see the tactic as a lingering tool of hegemony 
wielded by wealthy economic imperialists. 256 
The problem of weapons proliferation, moreover, is not simply on 
the supply side; the developing states' demand for the destabilizing 
forces must also be curbed. 257 Even a tight regime of export controls 
may do little to impinge upon the development of a truly indigenous 
tant ways, increasing the ability of Warsaw Pact and third world states to gain access to 
weapons-related technology. See Milhollin, supra note 34, at C2, col. I. 
252. In April 1987, seven developed Western states (the United States, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy, and japan) formed the Missile Technol-
ogy Control Regime, an agreement to enact parallel domestic restrictions in each state 
to regulate the export of nuclear-capable missile systems, production technologies, and 
key components. These criteria apply to any missile capable of carrying a 500-kilogram 
payload over 300 kilometers. To date, the Soviet Union and China, two important po-
tential suppliers of missiles for developing states, have not formally joined the control 
regime, although the U.S.S.R. has indicated that it will largely conform its own practices 
to the international standards. See Jones & Miiller, supra note 15, at 19; Morrison, 
supra note 36, at 971; Nolan, supra note 36, at 12; Schrag, supra note 36, at 14. 
253. See Donovan, Iraqi Smuggling Effort Bombs, Arms Control Today, Apr. I 990, 
at 27, 27. 
254. A conspicuous example of the failure of the international system of controls 
on the proliferation of weapons-related technology and goods is provided by the con-
struction of the chemical weapons facility at Rabta, Libya. The United States govern-
ment has alleged that the plant was made possible by covert, illegal shipments from 
commercial facilities in West Germany and other countries, evading a multilateral net-
work of restrictions over a period of years. See Bunn, U.S. Charges Libyan Plant 
Desigued to Produce Chemical Weapons, Arms Control Today, jan./Feb. 1989, at 26, 
26-27. 
One reason for the difficulty in sustaining leak-proof controls on the export of 
chemical, nuclear, or other weapons-related materials is the fact that, at least in market 
economies, the government's program of supply restrictions usually requires the active 
collaboration of, and substantial self-policing by, private entities because the govern-
ment does not have the resources to monitor each export shipment. These private 
firms, however, are motivated largely by profit-seeking opportunities, and have often 
participated eagerly in black-market exports. See D. Fischer, supra note 65, at 20. 
255. See Quester, The Non-Aligned States and Arms Control, in Arms Control: 
The Multilateral Alternative, supra note 18, at 113, 132. 
256. See D. Fischer, supra note 65, at 10; Mayorsky, supra note 54, at 89; Mohan & 
Subrahmanyam, supra note 46, at 233. 
257. Cf. V. Utgoff, supra note 65, at 8-9 (proposing methods to reduce demand for 
chemical weaponry, via promises of timely, effective assistance to victims of chemical 
weapons). 
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production capability inside a determined state. The international 
community };las considered a variety of mechanisms through which the 
leading military powers could enhance the security of <:Ifveloping coun-
tries, and hence reduce their reliance upon nuclear or other advanced 
weaponry.258 Multilateral disarmament, with economic development as 
a sweetener, can provide the needed element of incentives to make the 
overall approach work. We certainly do not propose that the devel-
oped states abandon their other efforts at nonproliferation; all available 
policy tools ought to be applied as consistently and as deftly as possi-
ble. What we advocate is enriching the range of tactics available to deal 
with modem threats: the developed states should also proffer some 
carrots, rather than being dependent solely upon increasingly ineffec-
tive sticks.259 
CoNCLUSION 
There are plenty of reasons why this program may not work. Some 
of the states that have been among the most problematic hold-outs 
against prior arms control efforts may similarly resist-and even be of-
fended by-this proposed bargain. In some instances, the leaders of 
developing countries may be so corrupt and self-interested that they 
care little about local economic well-being and the fate of their own 
people; such leaders will continue to pursue their own courses, clinging 
to power and making trouble internationally, with the offer of develop-
ment assistance holding no allure.260 And some states may be so im-
poverished, poorly organized, and mismanaged that no reasonable 
amount of foreign assistance will be able to make a substantial dent 
until internal decisions are implemented to reconfigure the national 
economic and political structures.261 
On the other hand, the proposal just might work. It provides a 
mutually beneficial international tradeoff, and nothing succeeds like an 
appeal to self-interest. If the international community can collaborate 
to reorganize the structure of states' incentives and costs that currently 
258. Among the strategies under discussion have been: networks of treaties or alli-
ances; declarations of "no first use" of specified weapons; commitments ("positive se-
curity assurances") to come to the aid of countries victimized by nuclear aggression; and 
commitments ("negative security assurances") not to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear-weapons states. See [1988] 13 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 223-33, U.N. Sales No. 
E.89.IX.5 (1988). 
259. Cf. L. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 128 (noting self-interest of developed states 
in aiding others toward economic growth); Note, supra note 109, at 26 (comparing use 
of positive inducements, such as supply guarantees, and of negative sanctions, such as 
trade embargoes, as tools of nonproliferation policy). 
260. See P. Harrison, supra note 70, at 292; L. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 104; 
Beilenson, supra note 68, at 842. 
261. See J. Baker, supra note 73, at 1; George Shultz, Efforts for Peace in Africa, 
Address, reprinted in 88 Dep't St. Bull. No. 2141, Dec. 1988, at 20, 22; Thee, supra note 
103, at 53. 
1058 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:993 
prevails, if we can provide positive inducements to tempt developed 
and developing states together to pursue these unconventional, but 
strongly reinforcing leads, then there is a chance that the scheme will 
meet its objectives. Tying together the diverse needs of very different 
groups of states, the international community may be able to resolve a 
nest of problems with a single, straightforward approach. 
Nations today have every incentive to explore new approaches to 
international peacekeeping, including even radical departures from the 
failed policies of the past generations. No one surveying the global 
panorama today can be content about the human condition or sanguine 
about the ability to avoid bloody conflict. The developing states are a 
miasma of poverty, despair, and helplessness-a perfect breeding 
ground for international trouble. The developed states are leaning on 
a precarious prosperity, as the threat of swiftly delivered, highly accu-
rate, and extremely destructive weaponry spreads around the world. 
The idea of giving away money will not initially be a popular 
one, 262 but careful thought will lead states to recognize that the danger 
of proliferation is profound. The developed states are losing control of 
their own security, and they will require the active cooperation of the 
developing world to build a more stable environment. A realistic ap-
praisal of the emerging threats is required, along with a willingness to 
deal with the modern world as it is-or as it is becoming, in the post-
Cold War era of multilateralism. 
An important conceptual leap is therefore required: for a genera-
tion, security leaders have taught us to think that the principal func-
tions of national defense expenditures are to deter bilateral nuclear 
war, to encircle a relentlessly hostile opposing superpower, and to gird 
ourselves against a single, Manichaean assault. We need now to shift to 
a more complicated, sophisticated understanding that the dangers of 
the modern world come in all sorts of forms and from diverse locations. 
The enterprise remains the same-promoting international stability 
and national security-but now we are compelled to adopt very differ-
ent strategies and policies to support it.263 
A colossal bargain-or series of bargains--can therefore be struck. 
The developed states have relative wealth, and they have always been 
willing to spend their treasure to pursue national security; here is a 
new, cheaper, safer way to achieve that goal. The developing states 
262. See P.T. Bauer, supra note 72, at 42-43; Beilenson, supra note 68, at 841-43. 
263. Cf. W.W. Rostow, supra note 75, at 75-76: 
Faced with this fact [the diffusion of power], there are three choices open to the 
Soviet Union and the United States. We can stumble into a war and destroy a 
large part of what man has built on the face of the earth and a large part of the 
world's population. We can continue the cold war until the diffusion of power 
removes the capacity to decide from Moscow and Washington. Or, working 
constructively together, we can [strongly influence] the terms on which power 
will become diffused. 
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desperately seek financial assistance in the struggle to modernize; here 
is a different path to obtain substantial quantities of assistance by es-
chewing the chimerical pursuit of advanced arms. 
The world currently faces immense, intractable problems: the un-
met needs for development assistance, the emerging risks associated 
with the proliferation of sophisticated weaponry, and the traditional in-
ability of the system of international law to cope with those stresses. 
We should now be able to fashion a single, symbiotic solution. 
